University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
5-2021

Economic Experiments on Conflict, Information Acquisition, and
Public Goods
Jeffrey Braxton Gately
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Economic Theory Commons

Citation
Gately, J. B. (2021). Economic Experiments on Conflict, Information Acquisition, and Public Goods.
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/3979

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Economic Experiments on Conflict, Information Acquisition, and Public Goods

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics

by

Jeffrey Braxton Gately
Hardin-Simmons University
Bachelor of Business Administration in Economics, 2016
University of Arkansas
Master of Arts in Economics, 2018

May 2021
University of Arkansas

This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

_____________________________________________
Peter McGee, Ph.D.
Dissertation Director

_____________________________________________
Sherry Li, Ph.D.
Committee Member

_____________________________________________
Andy Brownback, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Abstract
This dissertation contains essays on economic experiments. The first chapter, “Well,
at Least I Tried: Partial Willful Ignorance, Information Acquisition, and Social Preferences,”
focuses on the effects of information acquisition on social decision-making. The second
chapter, “Paved With Good Intentions: Partial Willful Ignorance and Group Identity in
Public Goods Games,” focuses on the effect of information acquisition on contributions to
public goods. I also explore human conflict in the third chapter, “Risk Preferences and
Reform Paths: Experimental Evidence.”
In my first chapter, “Well, at Least I Tried: Partial Willful Ignorance, Information
Acquisition, and Social Preferences”, I investigate whether remaining partially ignorant of
the consequences of one’s decision leads to a decrease in prosocial behavior. In the
experiment, subjects play as dictators (using the strategy method) in a dictator game,
where they must choose either a known distribution or an unknown distribution between
themselves and the recipient. They can choose to acquire signals about the recipient’s
payoff in the unknown game, and information acquisition may be costly or free. This yields
a 2 x 2 experimental design – information acquisition may be costly or free, and the
revealed distribution may be selfish or prosocial. I find that subjects acquire more free
information than costly information. I also find that subjects are more likely to acquire
additional signals when they believe that the unknown distribution is prosocial. On
average, subjects who believe the distribution in the unknown game is prosocial acquire
one additional signal relative to subjects who believe the distribution is selfish (conditional
on acquiring at least one signal). I also find evidence that subjects look for excuses to be
selfish.

In my second dissertation chapter, “Paved With Good Intentions: Partial Willful
Ignorance and Group Identity in Public Goods Games,”, I investigate whether remaining
partially ignorant of the consequences of one’s decision leads to an increase in free-riding
behavior in a public goods game, particularly when subjects are strongly attached to a
particular group identity. I do this by introducing a noisy signal to agents in a public goods
game; some agents go through an identity formation task to test the effects of identity on
information acquisition. Subjects then play a simultaneous public goods game. Data is in
the process of being collected and will be presented at the defense.
The third chapter of my dissertation, “Risk Preferences and Reform Paths:
Experimental Evidence”, uses an experiment to test the land reform model outlined in
Horowitz’s 1993 paper in The American Economic Review, “Time Paths of Land Reform: A
Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics.” The model predicts that, given risk-neutral agents,
there is a unique reform path that avoids conflict. When agents are risk-averse, multiple
safe reform paths exist. Risk-neutral agents should always accept the risk-neutral path,
while risk-averse agents should always accept both the risk-neutral and risk-averse reform
paths. I find that neither of the reform path types outlined in Horowitz prevent conflict, and
that this failure is explained neither by loss aversion nor by risk aversion.
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Introduction
This dissertation seeks to understand behavioral reactions to distributional and redistributional regimes. The three papers contained in this dissertation are intended to form
the foundation of a long-term research agenda, and, as such, it makes sense to present them
together, as they are jointly a launching point for the first research phase of my career.
Each represents a core research interest that builds upon behavioral reactions to
distributive and re-distributive possibilities. The first paper, “Well, at Least I Tried: Partial
Willful Ignorance, Information Acquisition, and Social Preferences,” examines behavioral
avoidance mechanisms towards redistribution through the use of information acquisition. I
find that subjects will use the act of acquiring information as a means to create a “veil of
ignorance” about the outcomes of their actions on others in a framework where they are
given the opportunity to equitably or selfishly distribute money between themselves and
another subject in the experiment.
The second paper, “Paved with Good Intentions: Partial Willful Ignorance and Group
Identity in Public Goods Games,” builds upon the first, but introduces a new distributional
mechanism (the public goods game) and adds an additional question of whether group
identity has a compounding effect with the “veil of ignorance” explored in the first paper.
Theoretical predictions suggest this will be the case, and also suggest that agents with
strong attachment to members of their own group will contribute less to the public good
when they believe that members of the other group will benefit more than members of
their own group. The final paper, “Risk Preferences and Reform Paths: Experimental
Evidence,” examines how agents react to a re-distributional land reform policy in the
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laboratory. The conflict-free paths proposed by the theory are not one hundred percent
successful, and this failure is explained by neither risk- nor loss-aversion.
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Chapter I: Well, At Least I Tried: Partial Willful Ignorance, Information Acquisition,
and Social Preferences
I.1 Introduction
Does partial willful ignorance enable non-prosocial behavior in a dictator game?
Since Dana et al.’s (2007) seminal work, economists have examined the impact of willful
ignorance on self-image (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Grossman and Van der Weele, 2017;
Wieland, 2017; Chen and Heese, 2019), social preferences (Ehrich and Irwin, 2005;
McGoey, 2012; Grossman, 2014; van der Weele, 2013; Feiler, 2014; Kajackaite, 2015;
Kandul and Ritov, 2017), and punishment (Bartling, Engl, and Weber, 2014). The literature
has generally found that willful ignorance is used as an excuse for subjects to engage in
selfish behavior. One notable exception is Kadul and Ritov (2017), which finds that most
dictators (16 out of 18) who choose to not reveal their own payoffs choose the prosocial
option in the dictator game. Broadly speaking, subjects use willful ignorance as a selfdeception mechanism to engage in their desired behavior.
However, an important question remains: how ignorant will subjects choose to
remain? In most previous papers in the willful ignorance literature, subjects may choose to
either know all the relevant information or none of the relevant information. However,
agents are often confronted with situations in which they must know some information
about a given situation, and may choose to self deceive by acquiring small amounts of
information to learn a negligible amount about the true state of the world while believing
themselves to be prosocial. Partial willful ignorance allows agents to conveniently deceive
themselves by making blanket assumptions about all states of the world from one state of
the world. For example, many relief organizations provide opportunities for people to take
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"humanitarian" or "mission" trips to impoverished areas to provide aid to the less
fortunate. However, if participants donated the money they spent on these trips, the impact
could be more economically significant, a fact which givers can choose not to know. Several
papers in the literature on rational inattention have explored how much information
agents choose to know (Cheremukhin, Popova, and Tutino, 2011; Caplin and Dean, 2015;
Dean and Neligh, 2017; Rafai and Toumi, 2018). However, this literature has yet to fully
explore partial willful ignorance in dictator games, particularly those in the Dana et al.
context. One notable exception to binary acquisition is Chen and Heese (2019); however,
though they arrive at similar findings to this paper and use a similar experimental design,
there are some notable differences between the papers, which are discussed further below.
I modify the dictator game set out in Dana et al. to allow subjects to choose the level
of ignorance about the state of the world. I use a 2 x 2 experimental design to examine the
intensive margin of ignorance. Each round, subjects are asked to choose between two
distributions as a dictator. The recipient’s payout in one distribution is unknown to
subjects. Dictators have the opportunity to acquire signals about the recipient’s unknown
payout. There are two main treatments: "Free," in which information acquisition is costless,
and "Costly," in which information acquisition is costly. Each treatment is divided into two
sub-treatments, "Prosocial," where the revealed distribution is egalitarian or very close to
egalitarian, and "Selfish," in which the distribution is skewed heavily in favor of the
dictator.
My main result is that subjects who believe the hidden distribution is prosocial are
overall 20.8% more likely to acquire an additional signal at any point than those who
believe the hidden distribution is selfish; however, this is decreasing in the number of
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signal draws. In addition, I find that subjects who choose the unknown distribution are
more likely to have searched for information when the known distribution is prosocial than
when the known distribution is selfish (20.1% more likely when information is free, 18.2%
more likely when information is costly). This provides evidence that people generally want
to feel good about themselves, so when they want to be selfish, they look for reasons to
justify their behavior. These two results, taken together, imply that subjects will find ways
to maintain a vail of ignorance when it is not possible for them to remain wholly ignorant. I
also find that subjects acquire approximately four fewer signals when acquisition is costly
than when acquisition is free. Subjects are 56.8% more likely to choose the prosocial
distribution than the selfish distribution when the prosocial distribution is the revealed
distribution. This demonstrates that, when confronted with an obvious, costless prosocial
choice, subjects will act prosocially. Finally, the type of revealed distribution (prosocial or
selfish) does not cause significant changes in unconditional information acquisition. This
implies that subjects search for information in a similar manner, regardless of the default
choice.
I.2 Literature
This paper contributes to the willful ignorance and social behavior literature that
follows from Dana et al. (2007) (hereafter, “DWK”). DWK use five treatments to examine
the effect of “moral wiggle room” on dictators’ decision-making. The “hidden information
treatment” bears the most similarity to this paper. DWK hide the recipient’s payoffs in two
different distributions from the dictator. The dictator may or may not choose to reveal the
recipient’s payoffs, allowing her to remain ignorant of how her choice will affect the other
player if she chooses. There were two variations on payoffs in the hidden information
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treatment. One set was the same as in the baseline dictator game (5, 5 for the fair
distribution and 6, 1 for the unfair distribution), and a “flipped” set (6, 5 for the fair
distribution and 5, 1 for the unfair distribution). Subjects know the possible distributions
and that they may choose to reveal the recipient’s payoffs. In the baseline distribution, 63%
of hidden-information dictators choose the unfair distribution, while 26% do so in the
standard dictator game. Fifty percent of the dictators overall in this treatment chose to
reveal the recipient’s payoffs. No ignorant dictators chose the fair distribution. In the
“flipped” distribution case, 81% of dictators choose the unfair distribution. However, 63%
of the dictators choose to reveal the distributions, and 67% of those who choose not to
reveal the payoffs choose the unfair distribution. These results indicate that the reduction
in transparency (in this case, via willful ignorance) increases the amount of self-interested
behavior.
Four papers build off of DWK and provide foundations for this paper. Grossman
(2014) varies the default option by requiring dictators to actively choose ignorance or
allowing revelation to be the default option. When dictators had to choose whether to
remain ignorant or reveal the information (i.e. there was no default), 25% chose to remain
ignorant as opposed to 45% when ignorance was the default option. When revealing the
information was the default, only 3% of subjects chose to remain ignorant, finding that the
decision to remain ignorant is heavily dependent upon ignorance being the default option. I
require subjects to actively choose ignorance in my design.
Van der Weele (2013) uses a similar design to Grossman (2014) to examine
whether the decision to reveal depends on the benefits of engaging in prosocial behavior by
changing the opportunity cost of choosing prosociality. As in Grossman, ignorance must be
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actively chosen. When prosociality is relatively cheap for dictators, only 6% of dictators
choose to remain ignorant (compared with 31% in the baseline treatment). However, when
lower opportunity costs are replaced with possible losses on behalf of the recipient, these
rates are 17% when the probability of recipient loss is 0.5 and 29% when the probability of
recipient loss is 0.8, implying that subjects are more motivated to choose ignorance when
prosociality is costly. Similarly, my model includes an information acquisition cost, which
can affect the level of agents’ prosociality.
Feiler (2014) uses a similar experiment to DWK to model information avoidance.
Subjects are shown a dictator game with recipient payouts hidden, and the probability that
the game is "aligned" (prosocial) is varied (and is known to subjects). There are eight
possible payoff sets, which subjects know, and two of the probabilities (0 and 1) reveal the
game type ("aligned" or "nonaligned") with certainty. Subjects are less likely to reveal
when the probability of an "aligned" game is high, and that participants behave according
to a "moral rule" when deciding at which probabilities to reveal information. I adapt two
innovations from this paper to my experiment: first, I reveal the recipient’s payoff in one
state of the world, but not the other, and, second, I elicit subjects’ beliefs about the
probability of the prosocial case occurring.
Grossman and Van der Weele (2017) find that Bayesian self-signaling drives people
to avoid inconvenient information about the outcomes of social decisions. In a Bayesian
self-signaling model, a decision-maker self uses choices to curate her image to an
"observer" self. The observer does not know the motivations underlying the decider’s
behavior. In a costly environment, the decision-maker self chooses both whether to acquire
information and whether to engage in an action given their choice of information
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acquisition. The observer self then takes the outcomes (and the information acquired) as
utility. In this manner, the decision-maker self can "deceive" the observer self by hiding the
decider-self’s true intent. They find that self-signaling can account for willful ignorance, and
that willful ignorance can be used as partial excuse for selfish behavior. Subjects in my
experiment can self-signal moral behavior to themselves by remaining partially (but not
wholly) willfully ignorant. This is an important innovation because it allows me to measure
the intensive margin of willful ignorance, which provides insight into its mechanisms
Chen and Heese (2019) use a modified version of the "Hidden Information"
treatment from DWK. They introduce a noisy signal using a 2 x 2 design. In two treatments,
subjects are forced to draw at least one signal, while, in the other, two treatments, they are
not forced to draw any signals prior to making a decision. Along the other treatment
dimension, two treatments increase the dictators’ payoff in one of the dictator game
options, while the other does not. There are two states of the world: in a "Good" state of the
world, the dictator’s and receiver’s payoff incentives are aligned; in a "Bad" state, they are
not. The state of the world is varied between-subjects. Subjects acquire signals about the
state of the world by drawing balls out of a "Good" jar and a "Bad" jar. After drawing a ball,
subjects are shown the Bayesian posterior probability of the state of the world. Subjects
can draw as many balls as they like, subject to time constraints. Each subject plays the
dictator game once, after which they elicit subjects’ own Bayesian posterior beliefs. They
find that dictators exploit information when faced with a self-benefiting option: A greater
proportion of dictators who have acquired information that suggests that the selfbenefiting option is selfish continue acquiring information, while the opposite is true of
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dictators who have acquired information that suggests that the self-benefiting option does
not harm the recipient.
I use a similar experimental design and find similar results; however, there are some
notable differences between my paper and theirs. First, information acquisition in their
paper is always costless; I include treatments that include costly information acquisition,
which allows me to inquire whether subjects are willing to pay to remain ignorant. Second,
though the information acquisition process is similar in both papers, Chen and Heese elicit
subjects’ beliefs about the outcomes of their actions ex-post, while I elicit beliefs about the
outcome of subjects’ decisions ex-ante as part of the acquisition process (after each signal
is acquired), which allows me to examine the intensive margin, not only of ignorance, but
beliefs. Third, subjects in their experiment play the dictator game once, while subjects in
this paper complete 30 rounds of the dictator task, and I vary the "Prosocial" and "Selfish"
states within-subjects to better understand how the same subject reacts to different states
of the world. In addition, I include three rounds of the Grossman-modified DWK task, which
allows me to compare the intensive and extensive margins of ignorance. Most importantly,
however, subjects in this paper know with certainty both the dictator and recipient’s
payouts in one of the two games, while, in Chen and Heese, dictators never know the
recipient’s payoff with certainty in either game. This distinction is crucial, because the
presence of a revealed game allows me to examine the behavior of subjects who search,
even when theory predicts that they should not.
I.3 Model
I use a diagnostic utility model model similar to those by Bodner and Prelec (2003)
and Grossman and Van der Weele (2017). In these models, utility is divided into two
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aspects: “outcome” (utility from payouts and/or welfare) and “diagnostic” (utility from selfobserved beliefs about one’s type), and each aspect of the utility function relates to a self:
the “gut” self, which only maximizes own profit, and the “observer” self, which updates
beliefs.
I.3.1 Priors of the Model
There are two active agents: Nature and the decision-making self (hereafter, the
“decider”), and a passive recipient of the decider’s actions. The decider cares about
maximizing her own net payoffs. Nature moves first and defines the payoff space:
𝜋𝐷𝑖 = {𝜋𝐷1 , 𝜋𝐷2 }
𝜋𝑅𝑖 = {𝜋𝑅1 , 𝜋𝑅2 }
where the subscripts denote the player receiving the payout (D for the decider, R for the
recipient) and superscripts denote specific payoffs for the decider and recipient,
respectively. All payoffs are drawn with equal probability. The difference between the
decider’s and recipient’s payoffs is given by 𝛱𝑖 ≡ 𝜋𝐷𝑖 − 𝜋𝑅𝑖 .
Call the magnitude of disutility the decider experiences from being selfish or utility
the decider gains from being prosocial 𝜑𝑖 (𝛱𝑖 ) ∈ {𝜑1 , . . . , 𝜑4 }, which is a mapping from 𝛱 to
𝜑. Assume 𝜑𝑖 > 0 if 𝛱𝑖 > 𝑘 or if 𝛱𝑖 ≤ ℎ (where 𝑘 ≥ 0 and ℎ ≤ 0 are constants above and
below which the decider experiences disutility from being selfish or from martrydom,
respectively), and 𝜑 < 0, decreasing monotonically, otherwise. Note that deciders may be
comfortable with small levels of inequality, hence 𝑘 > 0. In addition, the "warm glow"
effect would disappear beyond some point (e.g. approaching death), as agents are still
assumed to be self-interested profit maximizers and not martyrs, hence ℎ < 0. Since there
are two payout possibilities for each agent, this gives four cases for 𝜑𝑖 . Thus, she
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experiences disutility if the allocations are unfairly skewed in her favor and a “warm glow”
effect from being prosocial.
𝑑𝜑

Assume 𝜑𝑖 is increasing in 𝛱𝑖 (i.e., 𝑑𝛱𝑖 > 0). Intuitively, an agent that values
𝑖

prosociality will experience much greater disutility at the margin from extremely selfish
behavior than moderately selfish behavior. Define a noisy signal about the true value of 𝜋𝑅𝑖
to be 𝜎𝑖 ∈ {𝜎1 , . . . , 𝜎4 }. The signal tells the decider the true state of the world with
probability 𝑝𝑖 and gives the wrong state with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 . For simplicity, let the value
of 𝑝𝑖 be drawn randomly from a discrete uniform distribution bounded by 0 and 1. This
signal reflects the difficulty of discerning the true impact of one’s actions, even with
extensive search. Call the total number of signals acquired by the decider 𝑛𝜎 . Each signal
costs 𝑐. All probabilities are known by the decider and are drawn with replacement. For the
decider, expected utility is given by:
𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢(𝜋𝐷𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝜋𝐷𝑖 − 𝑛𝜎 𝑐 − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝑆𝑖 ]]

(1)

Where 𝑆𝑖 = {𝑠0 , . . . , 𝑠𝑖 } is the decider’s information set. The intuition for the
inclusion of 𝜑𝑖 is drawn from the diagnostic utility model laid out in Bodner and Prelec
(2003): this represents the portion of the self that values prosociality. The decider cares
about avoiding disutility from selfish behavior or gaining utility from prosocial behavior. If
the decider acquires no information at all (𝑛𝜎 = 0), then 𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 ] = 0.5𝜋𝑅1 + 0.5𝜋𝑅2 . With each
additional signal, the decider updates her expected value of 𝜋𝑅𝑖 . Using Bayes’ theorem gives:
𝑃𝑟(𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ) =

𝑃𝑟(𝜎𝑖 |𝜋𝑅𝑖 )𝑃𝑟(𝜋𝑅𝑖 )
𝑃𝑟(𝜎𝑖 )

(2)

Recall 𝑃𝑟(𝜎𝑖 |𝜋𝑅𝑖 ) = 𝑝𝑖 . Any given prior probability is itself dependent on previous
priors. To simplify notation, call the decider’s prior probability function 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 ). Let be the
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1

unconditional probability of drawing a given signal be given by 4. Plugging this into (2)
gives:
𝑝𝑖 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 )
1
4

(3)

𝑃𝑟(𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ) = 4𝑝𝑖 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 )

(4)

𝑃𝑟(𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ) =
Simplifying (3) gives:

𝑗

Similarly, the updated probability of 𝜋𝑅 occuring is given by:
𝑗

𝑃𝑟(𝜋𝑅 |𝜎𝑖 ) = 4(1 − 𝑝𝑖 )(1 − 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 ))

(5)

Combining (4) and (5) gives the expectation (after updating) of 𝜋𝑅𝑖 :
𝑗

𝜋𝑅𝑖 4𝑝𝑖 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 ) + 𝜋𝑅 4(1 − 𝑝𝑖 )(1 − 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 ))

(6)

The value of the decider’s payout is always known, but the recipient’s payout is
unknown. Disutility or utility from prosocial decision-making (prior to any signal
acquisition) is given by 𝐸[𝜑𝑖 ] = 0.5𝜑𝑖 + 0.5𝜑𝑗 , where 𝜑𝑖 , 𝜑𝑗 ∈ {𝜑1 , . . . , 𝜑4 } each denote a
possible disutility or utility. Since the decider always knows their own payout, the
probability of experiencing a given level of utility or disutility is equal to the probability of
encountering a particular payoff pair. The expectation prior to signal acquisition is:
𝜑𝑖 4𝑝𝑖 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 ) + 𝜑𝑗 4(1 − 𝑝𝑖 )(1 − 𝑓(𝑝𝑖−1 ))

(6)

Thus, the decider cares about acquiring this information for the sake of avoiding disutility
from selfish choices or gaining information about increasing utility from prosocial ones.
I.3.2 Information Acquisition
The decider acquires a signal if the expected reduction in disutility is greater than
the cost of information:
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𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝑆𝑖 ] − 𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝜎𝑖+1 ∪ 𝑆𝑖 ] ≥ 𝑐

(7)

Simplifying by combining with (6) gives:
(𝑝𝑖+1 − 1)𝜑𝑖 4𝑓(𝑝𝑖 ) − 𝑝𝑖+1 𝜑𝑗 4(1 − 𝑓(𝑝𝑖 )) ≥ 𝑐 ≡ 𝑐𝛾

(8)

Thus, the decider will acquire information for any 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝛾 . This gives:
Proposition 1: The decider will choose to acquire a signal if the cost of doing so is less than the
threshold cost.
I.3.3 Deciding Between Known and Unknown Distributions
Suppose the decider now faces the choice between two possible distributions. In
one, 𝛱𝑖 (and therefore 𝜑𝑖 ) is known, and, in the other, 𝛱𝑖 is unknown (as above). The
decider will chose the unknown distribution if:
𝑗

𝜋𝐷𝑖 − 𝑛𝜎 𝑐 − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝑆𝑖 ]] ≥ 𝜋𝐷 − 𝜑𝑗 (𝛱𝑗 )

(9)

𝑗

Where 𝜋𝐷𝑖 ≠ 𝜋𝐷 . Simplifying yields:
𝑗

𝜋𝐷𝑖 ≥ 𝜋𝐷 + 𝑛𝜎 𝑐 + (𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝑆𝑖 ]] − 𝜑𝑗 (𝛱𝑗 ))

(10)

Therefore, the decider will choose the unknown distribution if the payout from the
unknown distribution is greater than the cost of signals and net expected disutility, as well
as the alternative payout.
I.3.4 Comparative Statics
First, I explore how changes in 𝛱𝑖 affect the threshold cost, which allows me to
discern how the decider reacts to changes in the relative prosociality of the payouts.1

1

Other comparative statics not tested by the design are reported in Appendix I.A. These include
changes in the decider’s prior and changes in 𝜑𝑖 , both of which are ambiguous.
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Second, I demonstrate how the threshold cost changes with changes in the decider’s beliefs
about the state of the world.
I.3.4.1The effect of changes in 𝜫𝒊 .
Changes in the relative prosociality of the distribution may influence the threshold
𝑑𝜑

cost. Recall that 𝜑𝑖 is a a function of 𝛱𝑖 , and that 𝑑𝛱𝑖 > 0. Differentiating equation (8) with
𝑖

respect to 𝛱𝑖 gives:
(𝑝𝑖+1 − 1)

∂𝑐𝛾
𝑑𝜑𝑖
4𝑓(𝑝𝑖 ) =
𝑑𝛱𝑖
∂𝛱𝑖

(11)

This expression is negative (since 𝑝𝑖+1 < 1). This implies the relationship between the
threshold cost and the difference between the payouts is negative. This gives:
Proposition 2: The threshold cost is increasing in the prosociality of the payouts.
Therefore, as the decider expects the allocation to be more prosocial, then she
expects that the disutility from being selfish will be decreasing (or warm glow will be
increasing) and will be more amenable to acquiring information.
I.3.4.2 The Effect of Changes in Beliefs
Next, I consider how the cost changes with changes in updated beliefs.
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to 𝑝𝑖+1 gives:
4 (𝜑𝑖 𝑓(𝑝𝑖 ) − 𝜑𝑗 (1 − 𝑓(𝑝𝑖 ))) =

∂𝑐𝛾
∂𝑝𝑖+1

(12)

From equation (10), the threshold cost changes ambiguously with changes in the updated
beliefs. This follows from the intuition of diagnostic utility: since the "observer" portion of
the self gains utility from beliefs about how prosocial the "decider" portion of the self is
being, any agent’s overall utility should depend on how she perceives herself. This gives:
Proposition 3: Information acquisition changes ambiguously with a change in updated beliefs.
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When the decider will experience disutility from either allocation, his threshold cost
will increase if he perceives the severe case as more likely. Here, the decider would be
willing to pay more to seek out very bad news than moderately bad news. This implies that
it is easier to ignore small potential disutilities than large ones. If the decider knows he will
experience a "warm glow" effect from both (i.e. 𝜑 < 0), this effect is reversed. This gives:
Corollary 3a: Information acquisition is increasing in the decider’s perception of the likelihood
of the prosocial outcome and decreasing in the decider’s perception of the likelihood of the
selfish outcome.
Corollary 3b: Agents will avoid information about small disutilities, but not large disutilities.
I.4 Experimental Design
I.4.1 Hypotheses and Experimental Procedures
My design is similar to that used by Feiler (2014) and Grossman and Van der Weele
(2017). Two subjects play a dictator game in which the dictator has the choice between a
prosocial distribution and an selfish distribution between themselves and the recipient. In
keeping with the literature, the experiment used neutral language throughout; the
instructions may be found in Appendix I.D. The propositions outlined above generate the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: As the cost of information increases, less information will be acquired.
Hypothesis 1b: The rate of prosocial behavior will be higher when the prosocial choice is
revealed than when the selfish choice is revealed.
Hypothesis 2a: As agents believe the probability of the prosocial case increases, information
acquisition will increase. As agents believe the probability of the selfish case increases,
information acquisition will decrease.
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Hypothesis 2b: More information will be acquired when the payouts are prosocial than when
the payouts are selfish.
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 2b come directly from Proposition 1, Corollary 3a, and
Proposition 2, respectively. Hypothesis 1b is an implication of the model above: when both
the decider’s and recipient’s payouts are known, the state of the world is known, so the
decider knows the disutility she experiences from her choice. The profit-maximizing choice
for the decider when the known distribution is prosocial is to choose the known
distribution that carries no disutility, since the decider knows their payout in both the
known and unknown allocations, as the decider cannot know the exact magnitude of the
disutility they will experience from the unknown case. This general intuition provides
hypothesis 1b; specifically, this will depend on the individual’s disutility thresholds 𝑘 and
ℎ. Hypothesis 2a argues that people prefer to believe themselves to be "good" to believing
themselves to be "bad". This arises from the central argument of any diagnostic utility
model: people prefer to think highly of themselves. Hypothesis 2b follows a similar line of
intuition to Hypothesis 2a, but with a slightly different emphasis - when the known
distribution is prosocial, agents may search for information about unknown states to make
themselves feel better about not making an obvious prosocial choice: the "Well, at least I
tried" sentiment expressed in the title of this paper. These two hypotheses allow me to
capture the nuance between two different forms of self deception: one in which people
prefer to believe their intentions are "good," regardless of the choice they make
(Hypothesis 2a), and one where people want to argue that any selfishness on their part was
because they had to choose between the lesser of two evils, even though they tried to find a
better option.
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Each player participated in 30 rounds as a decider and recipient and had 60 seconds
to make their decisions. Subjects know they will be paid based on the choice of the dictator
in one randomly selected round in addition to their show-up fee of $7. Subjects were
provided with a paper copy of the instructions, which were read aloud prior to the
experiment. Subjects are not given any feedback about outcomes. Subjects completed a
post-experiment questionnaire that included demographic information, an incentivized
test of risk preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002), an incentivized, 6-item Cognitive Reflection
Test (Primi et al., 2016), questions from the Global Preference Survey about altruism,
other-regarding behavior, fairness, and risk preferences (Falk, et al., 2018; Falk, Dohmen,
Huffman, & Sunde, 2016), A 20-item measure of the Big 5 (Goldberg, 1999; Goldberg et al.,
2006), and a Locus of Control questionnaire (Rotter, 1966). The demographic
questionnaire asked subjects for their ethnicity, age, gender identity, years of education,
their academic college at the University of Arkansas, their major, and whether the subject
grew up in the United States, as well as 3 incentivized rounds of DWK’s original "Hidden
Information" treatment as modified by Grossman (2014). The CRT questionnaire from
Primi et al. includes questions from the original CRT first published by Frederick (2005).
The experiment was coded in Z-Tree (Fishbacher 2007) and was conducted in the
Business Behavioral Research Laboratory at the University of Arkansas. Ninety-six subjects
participated across 12 sessions. On average, subjects earned $13.89 (including the show-up
fee). Just under half (46.88%) of subjects were male. Each session lasted approximately 75
minutes.
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I.4.2 The 2 x 2 Design
All treatments are conducted between-subjects. Table 1 summarizes the 2 x 2
experimental design. All payoffs and costs were given in Experimental Currency Units
(ECU), where 1 ECU = $0.50. There are two treatments: "Free," where signal acquisition is
costless, and "Costly", where the cost of information is 0.10 ECU, which tests Hypotheses
1a. Both treatments are divided into two sub-treatments: "Prosocial," where the revealed
distribution is prosocial, and "Selfish," in where the revealed distribution is selfish.
Name
Selfish x Costly
Selfish x Free
Prosocial x Costly
Prosocial x Free
Hypothesis Tested by
Treatment Difference
Hypothesis 1a

Table 1: Treatment Differences
Known
Hidden
Distribution
Distribution
(6, 1) or (5, 1)
(6,5), (5,5), (6,1) or (5,1)
(6,1) or (5,1)
(6,5), (5,5), (6,1) or (5,1)
(6, 5) or (5, 5)
(6,5), (5,5), (6,1) or (5,1)
(6, 5) or (5, 5)
(6,5), (5,5), (6,1) or (5,1)

Signal
Cost
0.10 ECU
0 ECU
0.10 ECU
0 ECU

Difference in signals acquired between "x Free" and "x
Costly" treatments.
Hypothesis 1b
Difference in rate of Prosociality in "Prosocial x" and
"Selfish x" treatments.
Hypothesis 2a
Difference in signals acquired after "good" news vs. "bad"
news.
Hypothesis 2b
Difference in signals acquired between "Prosocial x" and
"Selfish x" treatments.
Note: Each treatment was equally likely each round. In the "Hidden Distribution,"
dictators knew their own payout, but not the payout of the recipient. The dictator payouts
were never the same between the hidden and known distributions.
These sub-treatments allows me to test Hypotheses 1b and 2b, and are conducted
within-subjects in order to control for defaulting. Each subject encounters each subtreatment an equal number of times; the order is varied randomly within subjects. Each
experimental session was conducted using the strategy method and there was a 50-50
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chance subjects’ choice would be binding. At the start of each round, subjects were
randomly matched.
I.4.3 Signal Acquisition
In all treatments, subjects choose whether to receive a signal about the recipient’s
payout in one of the allocations. The dictator knows the recipient’s payout in one of the two
allocations, but not the other. Subjects know the cost of information, which is paid out of
the subjects’ $7 show-up fee. Subjects can choose to receive a signal (or multiple signals)
about the recipient’s payout in the unknown allocation. Subjects may only choose between
allocations after they have actively chosen to stop acquiring signals (as in Grossman, 2014
and Van der Weele, 2013).
The “information box,” shown in Figure 1, allows me to test my hypotheses directly.
There are two jars of balls, red and white, each containing a message. Subjects may click a
button to draw a ball. This shows subjects the ball they have drawn and one of four
messages: "Your partner’s payoff is 1 ECU," "Your partner’s payoff is 5 ECU", "Your
partner’s payoff is not 1 ECU," or "Your partner’s payoff is not 5 ECU." Subjects know that
all balls are drawn with replacement. The number of balls of both colors was the same in
expectation each round.
Subjects may choose to stop acquiring signals by clicking the corresponding button,
after which they may choose a distribution. Subjects know that recipients are never aware
of how much (if any) of the information the dictator acquired. After subjects draw a ball,
they are asked to submit a "guess" about the value of the recipient’s unknown payoff by
clicking a button labeled "1" or "5." The guesses are unincentivized to prevent subjects
"hedging" their beliefs and their actions (Di Tella et al., 2015). Subjects submit a "final
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guess" in the same manner prior to choosing a distribution. Two early sessions did not
include the "final guess." This allows me to test hypothesis 2a.

Figure 1: Game Screen and the Information Box
My model does not explicitly incorporate a budget constraint; any binding budget
constraint would number the amount of signals acquired without affecting the comparative
statics. For an example, see Appendix I.B. For a more in-depth treatment of budgetconstrained search, see Manning and Manning (1997). Moreover, with feedback, even
drawing balls at 330 clicks per minute is insufficient to exhaust the budget constraint. The
addition of belief elicitation made this even more difficult.
In all treatments, there are four possible outcomes, summarized in Table 1. The
payoff variation allows subjects to justify a selfish choice in multiple ways. For example,
when a subject knows one set of payoffs to be unequal, they may assume that the other set
of payoffs is just as unequal: “Well, there’s nothing I could do – since I saw the first set of
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payoffs weren’t prosocial, I assumed the other set weren’t as well.” Subjects who know one
set of payoffs is prosocial may assume that the other set of payoffs is just as equitable:
“Well, since the first set of payoffs was prosocial, I assumed the other set as well.” Subjects
may also self-justify when the revealed distribution is selfish: "Well, since the first set of
payoffs was selfish, then the hidden set of payoffs must be prosocial." In all cases, subjects
are able to self-justify their non-prosocial behavior as a mistake, rather than as genuine
self-interest.
I.5 Results
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics of the data. Subjects searched in all treatments;
the unconditional average number of signals acquired overall was 3.45, and at least one
signal was acquired 66.46% of the time overall; subjects in the "x Free" treatments
acquired at least one signal 85.33% of the time, and 45.94% of the time in the "x Costly"
treatments. Subjects who chose to acquire at least one signal acquired 5.19 signals on
average.
Generally, subjects avoid being selfish - the prosocial case was chosen 63.23% of the
time. This cannot be solely caused by accidental prosociality: the unknown choice was a
prosocial distribution 50.21% of the time. Subjects choose the known allocation 46.94% of
the time, and only one subject always chose the revealed distribution all the way through
(one subject also never chose the revealed distribution). Sixteen subjects always chose the
prosocial distribution when it was revealed (including the one subject who always chose
the known distribution), but only six of these always chose the known distribution when it
was prosocial and never chose the known distribution when it was selfish. These results
imply that there is low risk of defaulting behavior contaminating the results.
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics
Demographics
Mean
% White
69.79%
% Black
14.58%
% Male
46.88%
Age
22.01
Grew up in U.S.
80.21%
EDUCATION
Mean
College: ≤ 2 Years
45.83%
College: > 2 Years
28.13%
College/Graduate Degree
25.00%
PERSONALITY
Mean
Altruism
7.37
Selfish Fairness
3.60
Other-Regarding Fairness
5.09
Locus of Control
4.54
Note: "Education Level" denotes the highest level of education subjects have completed.
Self-reported measures are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Locus of control is ranked
on a scale from 0 to 8, with 8 being the most external locus of control. The Cognitive
Reflection Test is scored out of 6.
I.5.1 The Relationship Between the Cost of Information and the Number of Signals
Acquired
Result 1: Subjects acquire fewer signals when acquisition is costly than when acquisition is
free.
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1a, that less information should be acquired
when signals are costly than when they are free. Figure 1 shows the average number of
signals acquired across each treatment, and provides early support for the first hypothesis.
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests of the individual means of signals acquired in each treatment,
reported in Panel I of Table 3, support the hypothesis that information acquisition in the
Costly and Free treatments are significantly different at the 95% level of confidence.
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Table 3: Treatment Differences in Search & Distributional Behavior
Panel I: Search Behavior - Average Number of Signals Acquired
Prosocial x Free
Prosocial x
Selfish x Free Selfish x Costly
Costly
Comparison
to...
Prosocial x
<***
<***
Free
Prosocial x
>***
>***
<**
Costly
Selfish x Free
<***
<***
Selfish x
>***
>**
>***
Costly
Table 3 (Cont).
Panel II: Differences in Distributional Behavior - Percent Prosocial Chosen
Prosocial x Free
Prosocial x
Selfish x Free Selfish x Costly
Costly
Comparison
to...
Prosocial x
<***
<***
<***
Free
Prosocial x
>***
<***
<***
Costly
Selfish x Free
>***
>***
<***
Selfish x
>***
>***
>***
Costly
Panel III: Differences in Known Distribution Chosen
Prosocial x Free
Prosocial x
Selfish x Free Selfish x Costly
Costly
Comparison
to...
Prosocial x
>***
<***
<***
Free
Prosocial x
<***
<***
<***
Costly
Selfish x Free
>***
>***
>***
Selfish x
>***
>***
<***
Costly
Note: All tests conducted in Panel I are one-tailed Wilcoxon sign-rank tests between the
means of the treatment variables. All tests conducted in Panels II & III are one-tailed
probability-ratio tests of proportions between the treatment variables. ">" indicates that
the median of the column variable is significantly greater than median row variable. "<"
indicates that the column variable is significantly less than the median of the row variable. "
- " indicates no significant difference. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 99%, 95%, and
90% level of confidence, respectively.
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One noteworthy result is that the difference in information acquisition in the the
"Prosocial x Costly" treatment significantly greater than acquisition in the "Selfish x Costly"
treatment (p=0.018). This supports a central notion of the model: when the revealed choice
is selfish, subjects will not spend too much to avoid being selfish. However, when the
revealed choice is prosocial, subjects may engage in costly search in an attempt to justify
selfish behavior. This is more thoroughly investigated below.

Figure 2: Search Behavior over Cost, by Treatment
Unconditional tests of means may fail to capture important sources of heterogeneity
in behavior (such as the effect of gender). To account for this, in Table 4, I estimate the
following specification:
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦

(13)

+𝛽3 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 + 𝜷𝒊 𝑿𝒊 + 𝜖
The variables beginning with "Prosocial_" are dummy variables indicating the prosocial
treatments, while the variables beginning with "Selfish_" similarly denote the selfish
treatments. A vector of controls, 𝐗 𝐢 , includes gender, race, session fixed effects, and
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subjects’ standardized locus of control score. Prior evidence suggests that gender is likely
to be correlated with prosociality (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001), as is race (Van Der Merwe and Burns, 2008). Locus of control may affect search
behavior; I would expect the marginal effects of the locus of control variable to be negative
(Caliendo, Cobb-Clark, Uhlendorff, 2015; McGee and McGee, 2016).
Table 4: Signal Acquisition by Treatment
VARIABLES
Prosocial x Free
Prosocial x Costly
Selfish x Free
Selfish x Costly
White
Female
Locus of Control
Session FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
OLS
6.395***
(1.956)
2.508**
(1.069)
6.390***
(1.775)
2.753**
(1.083)
-0.254
(0.755)
0.241
(0.710)
-0.324
(0.407)
Yes
96
0.158

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the marginal effects
in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero. Fixed effects for Session 5 and Session 6 were included in the original
specifications, but were dropped during the analysis.
Broadly, subjects are sensitive to cost. On average, subjects acquire more signals in
the "Prosocial x Free" and "Selfish x Free" treatments than in their "Prosocial x Costly" and
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"Selfish x Costly" counterparts. Note that these results seem to run contrary to Hypothesis
2b - I provide a more thorough treatment below. Wald tests of differences in the the
marginal effects for the treatment variables are insignificant; however, these tests find that
the "Selfish x Free" and "Selfish x Costly" treatments are close to significantly different at
conventional levels (𝑝 = 0.056). Session fixed effects are jointly significantly different from
zero (𝑝 = 0.002), but none of the other control variables are significantly different from
zero.
I.5.2 The Relationship Between Prosociality and Revealed Payouts
Result 2: Subjects choose the prosocial distribution more often than the selfish distribution
when the prosocial distribution is the revealed distribution.
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1b, that the rate of prosocial behavior will be higher
when the prosocial choice is revealed than when the selfish choice is revealed. I would
expect the rate of prosociality to be greater in the "Prosocial x" treatments than in the
corresponding "Selfish x" treatments. A "prosocial" decision is one where the subject made
a decision that led to a prosocial outcome, while also believing that they were making a
prosocial decision.
Figure 3 shows the rate of prosociality within each treatment. Panel II of Table 3
gives the results of probability-ratio tests of proportions of the prosociality variable. The
rates of prosociality should be significantly greater in the "Prosocial x" treatments than the
"Selfish x" treatments, since the decider knows the disutility (or utility) from the revealed
case. The results support this expectation: the rates of prosociality in the "Prosocial x "
treatments are both significantly greater than their "Selfish x" counterparts.
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The rate of prosociality in the "Prosocial x Free" treatment is less than than the rate
of prosociality in the "Prosocial x Costly" treatment at the 99% level of confidence (𝑝 <
0.001). This provides further support for the earlier conjecture that subjects search in the
"Prosocial x Costly" treatment as a means of self-deception. In addition, there is no
significant difference between the rates of prosociality in the "Selfish x" treatments. I
report a similar set of results in Appendix I.C with "prosocial" behavior restricted to
prosocial outcomes, regardless of beliefs. The results are qualitatively similar, but this
definition of prosociality allows for unintentional prosociality.

Figure 3: Rates of Prosociality, Adjusted for Intent, by Treatment
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the marginal effects from a probit model that controls
for heterogeneity in the data, given by the specification:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝐗 ′𝐢 𝛃𝐢 + 𝜖

(14)

𝐗 𝐢 is a vector of controls including measures of self-reported altruism, fairness, gender, and
session fixed effects. I include measures of fairness and altruism to examine the impact of
self-reported measures of social preferences on decision-making (Eckel and Grossman,
1996; Johannesson and Persson, 2000). Observations from the first two sessions were not
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included, as these two sessions did not include the "final guess" about the recipients’
payouts (which was used to generate the "intent" portion of the "Prosocial" variable). The
marginal effects of "Prosocial_Revealed" are positive and significantly different from zero.
Subjects are 55.6% more likely to choose the prosocial distribution when it is the revealed
distribution (𝑝 < 0.001). Gender and self-reported measures of altruism and fairness do
not have significant effects, and session fixed effects are not jointly significantly different
from zero (𝑝 = 0.2). Broadly, then, it seems that subjects have a preference for choosing
the known distribution when it is prosocial; subjects like viewing themselves as prosocial
agents.
The cost of information does not change the result. I run a second set of probits that
include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if information is costly, including an
interaction between the "Prosocial Revealed" and "Costly" variables, given by:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦
+𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 +

𝑿′𝒊 𝜷𝒊

(15)

+𝜖

Column (2) of Table 5 reports the results of these models. When the prosocial
distribution is revealed, subjects are 56.8% more likely to act prosocially than when the
selfish choice is revealed, even when controlling for the cost of information (with all
controls, 𝑝 < 0.001). Gender and self-reported measures of prosociality and fairness are
not significant, and session fixed effects are not jointly significantly different from zero
(𝑝 = 0.3). Therefore, subjects do not account for the cost of information when considering
to be prosocial in the known case. This is further support for the notion that, when subjects
do engage in search (particularly costly search), they do so in order to soothe their
consciences from the impact of being selfish.
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Table 5: Revised Prosociality by Treatment
(1)
VARIABLES
Prosocial Revealed

(2)

Intentional Prosociality

Intentional Prosociality & Cost

0.556***

0.568***

(0.023)

(0.029)

Costly

0.024
(0.0687)

Prosocial x Costly

-0.045
(0.063)

Female

-0.025

-0.026

(0.035)

(0.035)

0.006

0.006

(0.016)

(0.016)

0.010

0.010

(0.020)

(0.020)

0.008

0.008

(0.021)

(0.021)

Session FE

Yes

Yes

Observations

80

80

Self-Reported Altruism

Other-Regarding Fairness

Selfish Fairness

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the marginal effects
in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero.
One potential problem is that the higher rates of prosociality may be from subjects
defaulting to the known distribution. This could explain why control variables (gender and
self-reported measures of prosociality and fairness) were not statistically significant.
Recall, however, that the "Prosocial" and "Selfish" treatments were conducted within-
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subjects; if defaulting is occurring, subjects should choose the revealed distribution at the
same rate regardless of the particular subtreatment.
Probability ratio tests, reported in Panel III of Table 3, demonstrate that this is not
the case. Subjects choose the revealed distribution at significantly lower rates in the
"Selfish x " treatments than in their "Prosocial x " counterparts. This implies that subjects
choices do not result from defaulting behavior.
I.5.3 Subjects’ Beliefs about the Likelihood of the Prosocial Payout and Information
Acquisition
Result 3a: Subjects who acquire at least one signal are 21.1% more likely to acquire a second
signal if they believe the hidden distribution is prosocial after acquiring the first signal.
Result 3b: Subjects who believe the hidden distribution is prosocial are overall 20.8% more
likely to acquire an additional signal at any point than those who believe the hidden
distribution is selfish; however, this is decreasing in the number of signal draws.
These results provide weak support for hypothesis 2a, which argues that
information acquisition is increasing in agents’ beliefs that the hidden distribution is
prosocial. To provide a test of this hypothesis, I estimate the following linear probability
model:
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = β0 + β1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑋 + ϵ
“Additional Signal” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a subject who has acquired
X number of signals acquires signal X+1, or stops at signal X, and a value of 0 if a subject
who has acquired X number of signals stops at X. “Prosocial Beliefs at X” takes a value of 1 if
a subject believes the hidden distribution is prosocial at X and 0 otherwise. This is then
estimated over subsamples for subjects who acquire 1 – 2 signals and 2 – 3 signals. Column
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(1) of Table 6 gives the result for subjects who stopped at either 1 or 2 signal draws,
Column (2) gives the result for subjects who stopped at 2 or 3 signal draws. These two
samples account for 61% of search behavior. This methodology is necessitated because of
data limitations - the data contains information only on subjects’ beliefs in the second-tolast signal draw and the last draw.
The marginal effects on the “Prosocial Beliefs at X” variable for subjects who stop
after 1 draw or 2 draws are positive and significant, as expected (p<0.01): subjects who
believe the hidden distribution is prosocial after the first draw are 21.1% more likely to
acquire a second signal than those who do not believe the hidden distribution is prosocial.
However, this effect disappears after the second draw; the marginal effects in column (2)
on the beliefs variable are not significantly different from zero. However, the constant has
increased from 0.124 to 0.202, indicating that subjects who continue searching beyond this
point may be searching based on preferences for information rather than because of
preference for prosocial beliefs. To test whether the effect of prosocial beliefs is
diminishing in the number of signals drawn, I stack the data across signal draws from 1 to
11, and I run a similar model to the first of the form:
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = β0 + β1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑋 + β2 # 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑠
+β3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑋 ∗ #𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑠 + ϵ
“# Draws” is the number of signals that the subject has drawn up to X. “Prosocial Beliefs at
X * # Draws” is an interaction between the “Prosocial Beliefs at X” variable and the “#
Draws” variable. I expect the marginal effects of the “# Draws” variable to be positive and
significant if subjects are searching based on preferences for information in later draws. I
also expect the marginal effects on the interaction variable to be negative and significant if
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this is the case. Column (3) gives the results for the additional signal variable stacked
across signal draws up to 11 (which accounted for over 90% of search behavior). The
marginal effects on the “Prosocial Beliefs at X” is positive and significant – overall, subjects
who believe (after acquiring X number of signals) that the recipient will earn 5 ECU in the
hidden distribution are 20.8% more likely to acquire an additional signal than subjects who
believe the recipient will earn 1 ECU. Note also that the marginal effects on the “# Draws”
variable is positive and significant, indicating that at least some of the search behavior
observed is due to preferences for information. Finally, the marginal effects on the
interaction term are negative and significant, as expected. This indicates that the effect of
beliefs on subsequent signal acquisition is decreasing as the number of signals acquired
increases, which is also an indication that subjects have preferences for information.
Therefore, I have weak support for hypothesis 2a.
I.5.4 The Effect of the Revealed Distribution on Information Acquisition
Result 4: There is no significant difference in unconditional information acquisition between
the "Prosocial" and "Selfish" treatments.
This is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2b, that more information will be acquired
when the payouts are prosocial than when the payouts are selfish. In Table 4, there is no
significant difference in information acquisition between the "Prosocial" and "Selfish"
treatments, and that differences in search behavior are solely linked to the cost of
information.
Subjects should acquire more signals when the prosocial case is revealed than when
the selfish case is revealed. I run a regression with the number of signals required as the
dependent variable, given by the specification:
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𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑

(17)

+𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 + 𝛃𝐢 𝐗 𝐢 + 𝜖
𝐗 𝐢 is a vector of controls that includes race, gender, self-reported prosociality, and session
fixed effects. Column 2 of Table 6 reports the results. The treatment variable ("Prosocial
Revealed") is not significant and signed incorrectly. Session fixed effects are jointly
significantly different from zero (𝑝 = 0.003).
Table 6: Beliefs, Revealed Case, and Information Acquisition

VARIABLES
Prosocial Beliefs at X

# Draws

(1)
1-2

(2)
2-3

(3)
Stacked

0.211***

0.101

0.208***

(0.0517)

(0.0619)

(0.0460)

(4)
Revealed Case Signals
Acquired

0.0726***
(0.00423)

Prosocial Beliefs at X *
# Draws

Prosocial Revealed

Costly

-0.103***
(0.0124)
0.005
(0.462)
-4.932***
(1.746)

Prosocial x Costly

-0.250
(0.473)

Female

0.068
(0.659)
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Table 6 (Cont.)
VARIABLES

(1)
1-2

(2)
2-3

(3)
Stacked

White
Altruism

(4)
Revealed Case Signals
Acquired
-0.277
(0.881)
0.006
(0.183)

Constant

0.124***
(0.0173)

0.202***
(0.0299)

0.106***
(0.0198)

6.479**
(2.671)

Observations
1,394
1,169
4,218
96
R-squared
0.048
0.007
0.118
0.155
Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the coefficients in
parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero.
The "Costly" variable is the only significant major explanatory variable, and is
negative - subjects in the "Costly" treatments acquire, on average, 4.699 fewer signals (with
all controls) than those in the "Free" treatments. This supports the earlier finding from
Table 4. At first pass, then, it appears that there is no support for hypothesis 2b. It may be
that subjects search less in the "Prosocial" treatments simply because they are choosing the
revealed, prosocial distribution more than the hidden distribution. If this is the case, this
would explain why subjects do not search more when the prosocial case is revealed than
the selfish case. Subjects choose the revealed distribution about 46% of the time. Subjects
choose the revealed distribution about 71% of the time when the revealed payout is
prosocial. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I run a probit model where the
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the subject chooses the
revealed distribution, and 0 otherwise, given by the specification:
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𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 = 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑

(18)

+𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 + 𝐗 ′𝐢 𝛃𝐢 + 𝜖
Table 7: Signal Acquisition and Game Choice
(1)
VARIABLES

Prosocial Revealed

MFX

0.433***
(0.041)

Costly

-0.109
(0.074)

Prosocial x Costly

0.155**
(0.0771)

Female

0.062*
(0.035)

White

0.045
(0.037)

Locus of Control

-0.021
(0.017)

Session FE

Yes

Observations

96

Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the marginal effects in
parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero. Fixed effects for Session 5 and Session 6 were included in the original
specifications, but were dropped during the analysis.
𝐗 𝐢 is a vector of controls that includes race, gender, locus of control, and session fixed
effects. I control for cost because I want to ensure that the cost of information is not acting
as a confound to the Prosocial-Selfish treatment dimension. The results are reported in

36
Table 7. The marginal effects for the Prosocial treatment variable are positive and
significant - subjects are 37.0% more likely to choose the revealed distribution when it is
prosocial. The marginal effects for the "Prosocial x Costly" interaction variable are also
positive and significant. Women are 12.9% more likely to choose the revealed distribution
than men, and White subjects are 10.8% more likely to choose the revealed distribution
than non-White subjects. Subjects with a highly external locus of control are 6.1% less
likely to choose the revealed game. Session fixed effects are not jointly significantly
different from zero (𝑝 = 0.2). This confirms my earlier reasoning for the failure of
hypothesis 2b: subjects do not search more when the prosocial case is revealed because
they are more likely to choose the known, prosocial choice (which offers further indirect
support for hypothesis 1b).
I.5.5 Why do subjects search?
Result 5: Subjects who choose the unknown distribution search at significantly greater rates
when the revealed distribution is prosocial than when the revealed distribution is selfish.
Result 4 raises a question: why do subjects search at all? The overarching argument
of this paper’s model is that subjects engage in search behavior in order to feel better about
choosing selfish outcomes over prosocial ones. Thus, examining how subjects engage in
search may provide some evidence to support Hypothesis 2a. In the "Prosocial x Free"
treatment, conditional on choosing the hidden distribution, subjects searched for
information in 95.35% of cases. In the "Selfish x Free" treatment, 88.76% of subjects who
choose the hidden distribution acquired at least one signal. Therefore, the vast majority of
subjects who choose the hidden allocation search for information - over 85% of subjects
who choose the hidden distribution in both "x Free" treatments search for information first.
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In the "Prosocial x Costly" treatment, conditional on choosing the hidden
distribution, subjects search 64.45% of the time. In "Selfish x Costly," 40.00% who choose
the hidden distribution search for information. This implies that at least some subjects in
the "Prosocial x" treatments are using search to justify selfishness. If subjects are searching
at higher rates (conditional on choosing the unknown distribution) in the "Prosocial x"
treatments, it means that they are actively turning away from a guaranteed prosocial
distribution at greater rates than subjects in the "Selfish x" distribution are turning away
from a guaranteed selfish distribution, implying that subjects in the "Prosocial x"
distribution are looking for a reason to be selfish.
Table 8: Treatment Differences in Search Behavior, Conditional on Choosing the Unknown
Distribution
Prosocial x Free Prosocial x Costly Selfish x Free Selfish x Costly
Comparison to...
Prosocial x Free
<***
<***
<***
Prosocial x Costly
>***
>***
<***
Selfish x Free
>***
<***
<***
Selfish x Costly
>***
>***
>***
Note: All tests conducted are one-tailed probability-ratio tests of proportions between the
treatment variables. ">" indicates that the mean of the column variable is significantly
greater than the row variable. "<" indicates that the column variable is significantly less than
the row variable. " - " indicates no significant difference. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 99%, 95%, and 90% level of confidence, respectively.
Probability ratio tests, reported in Table 8, confirm that the differences between all
the conditional search rates are significant. Subjects who choose the hidden distribution in
the "Prosocial x Free" treatment have the highest rate of search among all treatments (𝑝 =
0.003 when compared to the "Selfish x Free" treatment, 𝑝 < 0.001 otherwise), and the
search rates in both "Prosocial x" treatments are significantly greater than their "Selfish x"
counterparts. This implies that Hypothesis 2a holds for a subset of participants (those who
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are looking for a reason to be selfish). For these subjects, the rate of search does increase
when the prosocial distribution is revealed.
To control for heterogeneity, I run a series of probits using the following
specification, the results of which are reported in Table 9:
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝐹 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝐶
+𝛽3 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝐹 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝐶 +

𝑿′𝒊 𝜷𝒊

(19)

+𝜖

"Search" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the subject acquired at least
one signal in a given round. "Hidden_" is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if subjects
chose the hidden distribution and 0 otherwise; the suffixes "PF," "PC," "SF," and "SC" denote
the respective treatment. 𝐗 𝐢 is a vector of controls that includes gender (because gender
should be inversely associated with search behavior to the extent that search behavior
reflects attempted selfishness), self-reported measures of altruism and fairness (which
should be inversely correlated with the dependent variable), locus of control (subjects with
a more external locus of control should search less than subjects with an internal locus of
control), and session fixed effects.
The results strongly imply that subjects use search as a means to self-justify selfish
behavior (Thaler, 2019; Exley, 2020). 𝜒 2 tests of the differences in the marginal effects of
the "Prosocial x Free" and "Selfish x Free" treatments are significantly different at the 99%
level of confidence (𝑝 = 0.005), and all other treatment variables are significantly different
from each other at the 99% level of confidence. Subjects who choose the hidden
distribution in the "Prosocial x Free" treatment are 20.1% more likely to have searched
than those who choose the known distribution. In the "Prosocial x Costly" treatment,
subjects that choose the hidden distribution are 18.2% more likely to have searched than
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those who do not. Subjects who choose the hidden distribution in the "Selfish x Free"
treatment are 9.9% more likely to have searched than subjects that choose the known
distribution.
Table 9: Motivated Behavior
(1)
VARIABLES

MFX

Hidden_PF

0.201***
(0.030)

Hidden_SF

0.099***
(0.027)

Hidden_PC

0.182***
(0.027)

Hidden_SC

0.040
(0.026)

Female

0.113***
(0.022)

Locus of Control

0.022**
(0.010)

Self-Reported Altruism

0.013
(0.010)

Selfish Fairness

0.075***
(0.012)

Other-Regarding Fairness

-0.044***
(0.012)

Session FE

Yes

Observations

96

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the marginal effects
in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero.

40
Those in the "Selfish x Costly" treatment are about 4.0% more likely to have
searched when they choose the hidden distribution, but this is not significantly different
from zero. The marginal effects of the "Prosocial x Free" and the "Prosocial x Costly"
treatments provide strong support for the conjecture that subjects use information
acquisition to avoid perceiving themselves as selfish. When the prosocial choice is revealed,
subjects who choose the unknown distribution are more likely to have searched than
subjects who choose the known distribution in the same treatment, meaning that they are
actively turning away from a known prosocial distribution. The results from the "Selfish x
Costly" treatment also provide some interesting intuition: subjects who choose the
unknown allocation in the "Selfish x Costly" treatment are no more likely than subjects who
choose the known distribution, so subjects who choose a known selfish distribution are no
more likely to have searched than subjects who choose the hidden distribution (which is
the only hope for prosociality in the "Selfish x" treatments). In effect, at least some subjects
in the "Selfish x Costly" treatment are paying to gather information on which they do not
act.
The marginal effects for gender, self-regarding fairness (where subjects do not like
being on the receiving end of selfish treatment), and other-regarding fairness (where
subjects do not like seeing others being on the receiving end of selfish treatment) are
significantly different from zero. Women are 11.3% more likely to engage in conditional
search than men. This is surprising, as the findings in the literature predict that these
Selfish fairness is significantly different from zero, but is signed positively (which is
opposite of what was expected). Locus of control is positively signed and significant, which
is what was expected; subjects with an external locus of control search more
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(conditionally) than subjects with an internal locus. Session fixed effects are jointly
significantly different from zero (𝑝 < 0.001).
Table 10: Beliefs and Actions
(1)
VARIABLES

MFX

Beliefs_Final

0.319***
(0.0317)

Female

-0.0492
(0.0356)

Self-Reported Altruism

-0.00702
(0.0132)

Selfish Fairness

-0.00656
(0.0158)

Other-Regarding Fairness

-0.00316
(0.0171)

Locus of Control

-0.00105
(0.0189)

Session FE?
Yes
Observations
80
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the marginal effects
in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero. Sessions 1 and 2 did not include the "Final Guess" and were not
included.
I.5.6 Do Subjects Act On Their Beliefs?
Result 6: Subjects who believe the hidden distribution is prosocial are more likely to choose
the hidden distribution.
Result 5 raises yet another question: do subjects who choose the hidden distribution
act in accordance with their beliefs? This question must be answered to ensure that the
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results laid out in Result 5 are not due to random behavior on the part of the subjects. In
order to test whether subjects act on their beliefs, I run a probit model:
𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝐗 ′𝐢 𝛃𝐢 + 𝜖

(20)

"Hidden" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the subject chooses the
hidden distribution. "Beliefs_Final" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
subject’s "final guess" indicated that they believed the hidden distribution was prosocial. 𝐗 𝐢
is a vector of controls that includes gender, self-reported measures of altruism and fairness,
locus of control, and session fixed effects. Table 10 reports the marginal effects. Subjects
who believe that the hidden distribution is prosocial on their last guess are 31.9% more
likely to choose the hidden distribution over the revealed distribution. None of the
marginal effects from the control variables are significantly different from zero.
Taken together, Results 5 and 6 provide strong evidence that subjects are searching
for reasons to be selfish, and actively believe that they are being prosocial by choosing the
hidden distribution. Interestingly, subjects’ beliefs were not much more accurate than a
coin flip in any treatment - the treatment with the highest accuracy of the final belief
measure was the "Prosocial x Costly" treatment, at 51.6% accuracy. This provides strong
indication that subjects are biasing their beliefs, not in accordance with the reality of the
situation (that both payouts for the recipient are equally likely), but in accordance with
their own desire to act in a particular manner.
I.6 Conclusion
Questions of how people’s beliefs about themselves affect their social preferences
stretch back all the way to Adam Smith himself, who, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
posited that people want to be viewed as "praiseworthy" and avoid being seen as
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"blameworthy." (Smith, 1759, pp. 113-114) I contribute to this great tradition by
answering the question, "How ignorant do people choose to be when exposed to varying
degrees of information?" From this paper’s results, I argue that people generally acquire
information only to the extent that it can be used as a self-exculpatory mechanism. Subjects
in the "Prosocial x" treatments search at significantly greater rates than their respective
"Selfish x" treatments. If agents are not using search as an exculpatory mechanism, then the
search rates should be similar among all treatments. Also, subjects who choose the known
allocation in the "Selfish x Costly" treatment are more likely to search for information than
those who choose the hidden allocation. Therefore, subjects must be gaining sufficient
utility from the search process to outweigh the cost of information. Clearly, then, subjects
have a desire to view themselves as "praiseworthy" (to borrow from Smith), and use search
to facilitate these ends.
I also find that subjects acquire less information when acquisition is costly. This
result, though hardly surprising (given the Law of Demand), provides further support for
the findings laid out in Van der Weele (2013). I also find subjects’ social preferences are
also strongly tied to the revealed distribution Taken together, these findings provide a
strong indication that subjects bias themselves towards "good news" about their potential
actions, consistent with a diagnostic utility approach (and consistent with Smith’s
reasoning). There are some limitations to this study. For example, this study does not
explore the effect of whether subjects will search until they find out the state of the world
with certainty; the sole purpose of this experiment is to examine how much subjects will
search, knowing that they cannot reach complete certainty. In addition, the current "x
Costly" treatments do not provide a sensitive test for how subjects react to different costs
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of information - more work is needed to confirm whether the partial failure of hypothesis
2b is truly because subjects do not search for more information when the prosocial case is
revealed, or whether the blunt force of the differences in cost obliterates the effect of any
other factors on information acquisition.
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Appendix I.A: Additional Comparative Statics
I.A1 Changes in the decider’s prior
To determine how the decider’s prior affects 𝑐𝛾 , I differente equation (8) with respect to 𝑝𝑖 ,
which gives:
∂𝑐𝛾
∂𝑓(𝑝𝑖 )
4[(𝑝𝑖+1 (𝜑𝑖 + 𝜑𝑗 ) − 𝜑𝑖 ] =
∂𝑝𝑖
∂𝑝𝑖

(I.A.1)

This expression is ambiguous. This gives:
Proposition 4: Information acquisition changes ambiguously with changes in the decider’s
prior.
Here,

∂𝑓(𝑝𝑖 )
∂𝑝𝑖

> 0. To make the rest of the expression clearer, rearrange the left hand side:
∂𝑐𝛾
∂𝑓(𝑝𝑖 )
4(𝜑𝑖 (𝑝𝑖+1 − 1) + 𝜑𝑗 𝑝𝑖+1 ) =
∂𝑝𝑖
∂𝑝𝑖

(I.A.2)

The intuition from equation (12) holds with equation (I.A.2). The decider will
require a lower subsidy for "very bad" expected news than "moderately bad" expected
news (and the reverse is true for "good" news). If the difference between utilities is small,
then the decider should choose not to acquire further information, since the cost of doing
so will outweigh the difference between the additional warm glow or punishment. This
gives:
Corollary 4a: The decider will not acquire information when she expects a warm glow from
both possible choices unless she expects the warm glow from one choice to be significantly
larger than the other.
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Corollary 4b: The decider will not acquire information when she expects a punishment from
both possible choices unless she expects the punishment from one choice to be significantly
smaller than the other.
I.A2 The Effect of Changes in Utilities
I also wish to examine the effect of changes in 𝜑𝑖 and 𝜑𝑗 on the threshold cost. Starting with
𝜑𝑖 :
(𝑝𝑖+1 − 1)4𝑓(𝑝𝑖 ) =

∂𝑐𝛾
∂𝜑𝑖

(I.A.3)

When 𝜑𝑖 > 0 this expression is negative, since 𝑝𝑖+1 < 1, so the threshold cost decreases as
𝜑𝑖 increases. The opposite is true when 𝜑𝑖 < 0. Taking the partial with respect to 𝜑𝑗 gives:
−𝑝𝑖+1 4(1 − 𝑓(𝑝𝑖 )) =

∂𝑐𝛾
∂𝜑𝑗

(I.A.4)

This expression is also negative when 𝜑𝑗 > 0 and positive when 𝜑𝑗 < 0. Taken together,
equations (I.A.3) and (I.A.4) give:
Proposition 5a: As disutility increases, less information will be acquired.
Proposition 5b: As warm glow increases, more information will be acquired.
Therefore, as the extra utility from warm glow increases, the decider will be more
amenable to acquiring information. This can be thought of as the proverbial "Patting one’s
self on the back" - as I keep acquiring more information about how good of a person I am, I
feel better and better about myself, causing me to acquire even more information. On the
other hand, as the disutility from selfishness increases, the decider will not wish to acquire
extra information. This can be thought of as an attempt to stop the downward spiral of
negative emotions that come from perceiving one’s self as selfish - an attempt to stop
"beating one’s self up about it."
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Appendix I.B: Budget-Constrained Search
Consider a similar model of search to the one in the main paper. However, assume that
information acquisition costs are now paid out of the decider’s endowment rather than
exogenously. The decider’s utility is given by (as before):
𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢(𝜋𝐷𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝜋𝐷𝑖 − 𝑛𝜎 𝑐 − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ]]

(I.B.1)

Further, let the decider’s utility from acquiring an additional signal be expressed by:
𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢(𝜋𝐷𝑖+1 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝜋𝐷𝑖+1 − (1 + 𝑛𝜎 )𝑐 − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖+1 ]]

(I.B.2)

Further, define 𝜋𝐷𝑖+1 = 𝜋𝐷𝑖 − 𝑛𝜎 𝑐. In order for the decider to acquire a signal, the expected
utility from doing so must be greater than or equal to the decider’s current utility.
Combining (1) and (I.B.2) gives:
𝜋𝐷𝑖+1 − (1 + 𝑛𝜎 )𝑐 − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖+1 ]] ≥ 𝜋𝐷𝑖 − 𝑛𝜎 𝑐 − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ]]

(I.B.3)

Simplifying (I.B.3) gives:
𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝜋𝑅𝑖 |𝜎𝑖+1 ]]
(𝑛𝜎 + 1)

≥ 𝑐 ≡ 𝑐𝛼

(I.B.4)

Recall that the unconstrained threshold cost, 𝑐𝛾 , is given by:
𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝜎𝑖 ] − 𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝜎𝑖+1 ] ≥ 𝑐 ≡ 𝑐𝛾
The only scenario in which 𝑐𝛼 = 𝑐𝛾 is when 𝑛𝜎 = 0. In all other cases, it is clear from
equations (I.B.4) and (4) that 𝑐𝛾 > 𝑐𝛼 . which implies that fewer signals will be acquired
under budget-constrained search than under unconstrained search.

(4)
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Appendix I.C: Alternative Specifications
I.C1 Unadjusted Prosociality and Revealed Payouts
Figure I.C 1 shows the means of the unadjusted "Prosocial" variable, which takes a value of
"1" if subjects choose the prosocial distribution and 0 otherwise. Importantly, this variable
classifies a choice as "prosocial" regardless of intent; I include this analysis to provide
further robustness checks for my main results. Probability-ratio tests, reported in Table
I.C.1, partially support these differences. Both "Prosocial x " have significantly greater than
their "Selfish x " counterparts, as expected (p < 0.01 in both cases). However, the rate of
unadjusted prosocial behavior is significantly greater in the "Prosocial x Costly" than in the
"Prosocial x Free" treatment; this also holds true for the "Selfish x Costly" and "Selfish x
Free" treatments (p <0.01 in both cases).

Figure I.C 1
The rate of unadjusted prosociality in "Prosocial x Costly" is also significantly
greater than that in "Selfish x Free." Most interestingly, the rate of unadjusted prosocial
behavior in the "Prosocial x Free" treatment is not significantly different from that in the
"Selfish x Costly" treatment. This lends further support to my earlier conjecture that
subjects may be attempting to self-justify selfish behavior in the "Prosocial x " treatments.
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In addition, this also implies that subjects will be more likely to be prosocial when attempts
to be selfish are costly.
Table I.C.1: Treatment Differences in Distributional Behavior - Percent of time Prosocial
Distribution Chosen
Prosocial x Free Prosocial x Costly Selfish x Free Selfish x Costly
Comparison to...
Prosocial x Free
>***
<***
Prosocial x Costly
<***
<***
<***
Selfish x Free
>***
>***
>***
Selfish x Costly
>***
<***
Note: All tests conducted are one-tailed probability-ratio tests of proportions between the
treatment variables. ">" indicates that the mean of the column variable is significantly
greater than the row variable. "<" indicates that the column variable is significantly less
than the row variable. " - " indicates no significant difference. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level of confidence, respectively.
Column (1) of Table 14 reports the marginal effects from a probit model that I run to
control for heterogeneity in the data, given by the specification:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛃𝐢 𝐗 𝐢 + 𝜖

(I.C.1)

The treatment variable, "Prosocial Revealed," is a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 if the revealed distribution was prosocial. "𝐗 𝐢 " is a vector of controls, including gender,
session fixed effects, and standardized, self-reported scores of altruism and fairness. I
would expect the marginal effects of these last three self-reported measures to be
positively signed and significant, as subjects with strong preferences for fairness and
altruism should be more prosocial than subjects with lower scores. The marginal effects
confirm the story above; subjects are 47.4% more likely to choose prosocially when they
are shown the prosocial choice. To account for the impact of information costs, I run a
second probit that included a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if information is
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costly. I also include an interaction between the "Prosocial Revealed" and "Costly"
variables:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦

(I.C.2)

+𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 + 𝑿′𝒊 𝜷𝒊 + 𝜖

Column (2) of Table 14 reports the results of these models. As in the original probit
models, the marginal effects of the prosocial case being revealed are positive and
Table I.C.2: Prosociality by Treatment
(1)
VARIABLES
Prosocial Revealed

(2)

Probit

Costs

0.474***

0.459***

(0.0195)

(0.0290)

Costly

-0.0115
(0.0509)

Prosocial x Costly

0.0386
(0.0489)

Female

-0.0247

-0.0247

(0.0226)

(0.0226)

-0.00730

-0.00734

(0.0114)

(0.0114)

0.00984

0.00969

(0.0145)

(0.0144)

Session FE?

Yes

Yes

Observations

96

96

Self-Reported Altruism

Other-Regarding Fairness

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported below the marginal effects
in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1, and specify
difference from zero.
significantly different from zero. The inclusion of a control for costly acquisition decreases
the magnitude of the marginal effects by about 2% from the original specification, meaning
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that the inclusion of a cost variable makes subjects 2% less likely (the marginal effects of
the "Prosocial Revealed" is now 45.9%) to be prosocial when the prosocial choice is
revealed. However, the marginal effects of both the cost variable and interaction term are
insignificant and less than 0.1, indicating that cost of information acquisition does not
significantly impact subjects’ decision to choose the prosocial distribution.
These results show a similar pattern to those outlined in the main text, providing
further support for hypothesis 1b. The primary difference between these results and the
ones in the main body of this paper is that the unadjusted prosociality variable is not
robust to the addition of costs, which suggests that failing to adjust prosociality for intent
results in an artificially high level of prosocial behavior in the presence of costs.
Appendix I.D: Experimental Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the
experiment.
This experiment will consist of 30 rounds. At the beginning of each round you will be
assigned a type, X or Y. Half the players will be X, and half will be Y. These roles will be
explained shortly. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly paired with
another subject of the opposite type, but you will not be told which role you have been
assigned.
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Earnings
You will be paid your earnings from one randomly selected round at the end of the
experiment. In this experiment, we will use Experimental Currency Units. ECU’s have an
exchange rate of 1 ECU = 0.50 USD.
The Roles
Player X will choose which set of payouts she and Player Y will receive. Player Y will receive
the payout given to them by Player X. You and your partner will both play as Player X.
During the round, the computer will assign a random number to you and your partner.
Whoever has the higher random number will be Player X. You will not know which role has
been chosen for you. If you are Player X, the computer will use your choice to determine the
payouts you and your partner receive.
Rounds
We will play 30 rounds, each 60 seconds long.
The Games
Each round, you will have the option of choosing between two sets of payouts, called
“games.” Let’s call these Game A and Game B. Each game consists of an amount of money
for you and an amount of money for the other player.
Set 1
X
Y

Game A
6 ECU
5 ECU

Set 2
Game B
5 ECU
1 ECU

X
Y

Game A
6 ECU
1 ECU

Set 3
X
Y

Game A
6 ECU
5 ECU

Game B
Game A
5 ECU
X
6 ECU
5 ECU
Y
1 ECU
Figure 1: Possible payoff combinations

Game B
5 ECU
5 ECU
Set 4
Game B
5 ECU
1 ECU
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Let’s call these amounts of money “payoffs.” You can see all the possible games in this
experiment outlined in Figure 1. At the start of each round, you will be shown Player X’s
payoffs in both games, and you will be shown Player Y’s payoff in one of the games but will
not be shown Player Y’s payoff for the other game. The payoff you know will be randomly
determined each round. You may choose to acquire signals about Player Y’s payoffs in the
unknown game in the process described below. Each set of payoffs for player Y are equally
likely each round. You and your partner may or may not see the same set of payoffs each
round.
Signals
Each round, you will have the ability to acquire signals about player Y’s payouts. There are
two types of signal: “true” signals and “random” signals. Each signal will consist of a red or
white ball containing a statement about the value of Player Y’s payoff. These balls are
drawn from two jars: one represents a true signal and one represents a random signal. The
total number of balls in each jar will be equal; however, the ratio of red balls to white balls
in each jar may change from round to round. You will be told the total number of balls in
each jar, as well as the number of red and white balls in each jar. You will not be told which
jar the ball has been drawn from, and the ball will be returned to the jar it was drawn from
once your draw is complete.
Cost of signal
You will incur a cost of 0.10 ECU each time you draw a ball. These costs will be paid out of
your show-up fee of $7 (14 ECU). This is referred to as your “signal budget.” You will have a
14 ECU signal budget in each round.
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Signal Acquisition
If you wish to acquire a signal, you may click the button in each information box that says
“Draw Ball.” You may draw as many balls as your 14 ECU signal budget will allow. You may
choose to stop drawing balls at any time during the game (or may choose to not draw any
balls at all) by clicking the “Finished Drawing Balls” button. This will cause the information
box to disappear.
The Guess
After each ball you draw, you will be asked, “Based on the information to the left, what do
you think Player Y’s payout will be if you choose Game B?” To submit your guess, you can
click the button labelled “1” or the button labeled “5.” You will not be paid for your guess.
Once you submit your guess, you will have the opportunity to draw another ball. You will
also be asked to submit a guess about player Y’s payout once you are finished drawing
balls.
Game Choice
Once you have clicked the “Stop Drawing Balls” button, you will be able to choose between
games by clicking the buttons labeled “Choose A” if you prefer game A, or “Choose B” if you
choose game B. Only player X’s decision will be used by the computer. After you and your
partner have both chosen and the entire 60 seconds have elapsed, you will move straight
into the next round. You will not see your partner’s choices, nor will your partner see your
choices. You will also not be told your role, nor will you be told your partner’s role.
Example 1
You are presented with the following information on the game screen:
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Game A
6
1

Player X
Player Y
True Jar
Red Balls
White Balls
Total by Jar

Random
Jar

40
20
10
30
50
40
Your Draw

Game B
5
?
Total
Balls by
Color:
60
40
100

Stop Drawing Balls

Budget Information
Ball Budget Remaining:
Cost of each Ball:
# Draws:

14.00
0.1
0

Draw Ball

You may now choose to acquire a signal about player Y’s payoffs in Game B. You click the
“Draw Ball” button, and you now see:
Game A
6
1

Player X
Player Y
True Jar
Red Balls
White Balls
Total by Jar

Random
Jar

Game B
5
?
Total
Balls by
Color:
60
40
100

40
20
10
30
50
40
Your Draw
If you choose Game B, Player Y
will earn 5 ECU.

1

Budget Information
Ball Budget Remaining:
Cost of each Ball:
# Draws:

13.90
0.1
1

Based on the information to the
left, what do you think Player Y’s
payout will be if you choose Game
B?
5
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Now, you see a red ball and a message at the bottom of your screen, as well as the
opportunity to submit your guess about Player Y’s payout. You submit your guess and now
have the opportunity to draw another ball. You decide to draw another ball. You now see:
Game A
6
1

Player X
Player Y
True Jar
Red Balls
White Balls
Total by Jar

Random
Jar

Game B
5
?
Total
Balls by
Color:
60
40
100

40
20
10
30
50
40
Your Draw
If you choose Game B, Player Y
will earn 5 ECU.

1

Budget Information
Ball Budget Remaining:
Cost of each Ball:
# Draws:

13.80
0.10
2

Based on the information to the
left, what do you think Player Y’s
payout will be if you choose
Game B?
5

Now, you see a white ball and a message at the bottom of your screen, as well as the
opportunity to submit your guess about Player Y’s payout. Notice that the red ball that you
drew previously has been put back in its jar. You submit your guess and have the
opportunity to draw another ball. You decide to stop drawing balls, so you click the “Stop
Drawing Balls” button, and you see:
Game A
Game B
Player X
6 ECU
5 ECU
Player Y
1 ECU
?
Based on the information you just observed, what do you think Player Y’s payout will
be if you choose Game B?
1

5
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You submit your guess, and you now see:
Game A
6 ECU
1 ECU

Player X
Player Y

Game B
5 ECU
?

Choose A

Choose B

You choose game A, and the round ends. Your decision will be used by the computer if you
are Player X.
Example 2
You are presented with the following information on the game screen:
Game A
6
5

Player X
Player Y
True Jar
Red Balls
White Balls
Total by Jar

Random
Jar

50
30
15
35
65
65
Your Draw

Game B
5
?
Total
Balls by
Color:
80
50
130

Stop Drawing Balls

Budget Information
Ball Budget Remaining:
Cost of each Ball:
# Draws:

14.00
0.10
0

Draw Ball

You may now choose to draw a ball. You decide you do not wish to draw one, so you clock
“Stop Drawing Balls.” The game screen becomes:
Game A
Game B
Player X
6 ECU
5 ECU
Player Y
1 ECU
?
Based on the information you just observed, what do you think Player Y’s payout will
be if you choose Game B?
1

5
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You submit your guess, and you now see:
Player X
Player Y

Game A
6 ECU
5 ECU
Choose A

Game B
5 ECU
?
Choose B

You choose Game B and continue to the next round, and your choice will be used by the
computer if you are Player X.
We will play 30 rounds. You will be paid based on Player X’s choice for 1 randomly
selected round of the 30, and you will not learn which round has been selected until all 30
rounds have been completed. Following the completion of 30 rounds, you will be asked to
answer a short questionnaire, part of which you will be paid for. Then, you will be paid
your total earnings and dismissed. In addition to your earnings from the experiment, all
subjects will receive a 14 ECU ($7) show-up fee, less the total cost of signals you acquired
in the round chosen as the payment round. Are there any questions?
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Chapter II: Paved with Good Intentions: Group Identity and Partial Willful Ignorance
in Public Goods Games.
II.1 Introduction
Do agents in a public goods games use information acquisition as a self-deception
mechanism that enables free-riding? If so, is the amount of information acquired different
when the other contributors are part of one’s ingroup than when the other contributors are
part of the other contributor’s outgroup? Uncertainty in public goods provision games has
been studied thoroughly: papers have examined the effect of an uncertain benefits (Levati
et al., 2009; Levati and Morone, 2013; Boulu-Reshef, Brott, and Zylbersztejn, 2017; Cox and
Stoddard, 2018) and unknown contributions by other players (Bigoni and Suetens, 2012;
Kandul and Lanz, 2018). In general, this literature has found that uncertainty decreases
contributions. However, little research has been conducted about the degree of information
agents will acquire prior to making decisions, or to what degree group identity affects
information acquisition.
In many previous papers in the public goods literature, uncertainty reduction is
controlled by the experimenter (Levati et al., 2009; Levati and Morone, 2013; Boulu-Reshef,
Brott, and Zylbersztejn, 2017), via cheap talk (Cox, 2015; Cox and Stoddard, 2018) or the
information acquisition process is binary (Bigoni and Suetens, 2012; Kandul and Lanz,
2018) - either subjects know the true state of the world with certainty or they do not.
However, little study has been devoted to how much information subjects will choose to
acquire about benefits from a public good to both themselves or others. This is related to
the literature on willful ignorance arising from Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007), as well as
the literature on heterogeneous benefits from public goods.
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If agents are utilizing willful ignorance reinforced with social identity to make
decisions about contributing to public good, the findings of this paper may provide
significant policy implications. For example, voters of a certain political persuasion may
choose to acquire just enough information to vote for a particular proposal, while
remaining ignorant of its negative consequences (or vice versa), particularly if voting for
this policy would disproportionately benefit members of the voters’ outgroup. Therefore,
understanding the extent of information acquisition and its effect on public goods
provision is crucial to understanding public goods provision. This paper builds on the
existing literature by allowing subjects to choose how much information (if any) they will
choose to acquire in a public goods game, and by introducing group identity to the willful
ignorance literature.
II.2 Literature
This paper contributes to three streams of literature: the willful ignorance and
social behavior literature that arises out of Dana et al. (2007) (hereafter, “DWK”), the group
identity and social preferences arising out of Chen and Li (2009), and the experimental
public goods literature. DWK use five treatments to examine the effect of “moral wiggle
room” on dictators’ decision-making. There are two distributions for the dictator to choose
from: an equitable distribution and an inequitable distribution. In the “hidden information
treatment,” which bears the most similarity to this paper, DWK give dictators two
allocations, one equitable and one selfish, to choose from. They the partner’s payoffs in
both distributions from the dictator. They find that the reduction in transparency (in this
case, via willful ignorance) increases the amount of self-interested behavior, and that the
majority of dictators choose to remain ignorant of the recipients’ payoffs.
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In the years that have followed, much of the economics literature on willful
ignorance has been focused on willful ignorance as a manipulating device for self-image
(Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Wieland, 2017), social
preferences (Ehrich and Irwin, 2005; McGoey, 2012; Grossman, 2014; van der Weele, 2014;
Feiler, 2014; Kajackaite, 2015; Kandul and Ritov, 2017), punishment avoidance (Bartling,
Engl, and Weber, 2014), and public goods (Bigoni and Suetens, 2012; Kandul and Lanz,
2018). Two papers (Chen and Heese, 2019; Gately, 2021) examine the the intensive margin
of willful ignorance, though these are confined to the dictator game context. Generally
speaking, the literature finds that ignorance, whether the result of gradual information
acquisition or one-shot information acquisition, increases the amount of self-interested
behavior.
Evidence regarding the exact impact of uncertainty in public goods games is
somewhat mixed, and much of the research to date has focused on uncertain benefits of
public goods. Levati et al. (2009) examine the effect of uncertain benefits on contributions
in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) game by introducing a scenario in which the
benefit (captured by MPCR) is uncertain across two possible states of the world. Subjects
are told the probability with which each state will occur. They find that imperfect
information decreases average private contributions significantly, and that optimistic
beliefs about partners’ contributions are linked to higher contribution levels. Levati and
Morone (2013) builds on Levati et al.’s by adding an uncertain environment (in which the
MPCR is unknown without any probabilities) to the existing “risky” environment from
Levati et al. They find that the introduction of risk and uncertainty about the value of public
goods does not affect contribution levels. Boulu-Reshef, Brott, and Zylbersztejn (2017) add
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an extra layer of uncertainty to previous public goods games by requiring players to
contribute to the public good before players find out their own MPCR. They find that
uncertainty across MPCR does not negatively affect public goods provision. Cox and
Stoddard (2018) examine the effect of information acquisition on public goods games via a
cheap talk mechanism. They find that subjects tend to contribute when at least two or three
pieces of information (including both the subject’s own signal and messages from her
partners) are favorable, and that favorable messages from others may override the
subject’s own unfavorable signal. However, this result degrades when incentives to tell the
truth are reduced.
Two papers build off the existing public goods and moral wiggle room literature.
Bigoni and Suetens (2012) use five treatments to examine the effects of feedback in public
goods games. In one treatment (CorE), subjects have the option to know their partners’
individual contributions or earnings; subjects may also choose to remain wholly ignorant
of these. They find that, out of the five treatments, CorE has the highest level of
contributions among the five treatments. Kandul and Lanz (2018) include two treatments
that allow subjects to engage in willfully ignorant behavior. In one treatment, subjects can
choose to reveal or ignore the average contribution of individuals within their group
compared to their own contribution; in the other, subjects may choose to reveal or ignore
their whole group’s standing relative to the other groups in terms of average contributions.
The former treatment bears the most resemblance to to this paper. However, as with much
of the literature, subjects in both papers face a binary choice – they may choose to know all
of the information available, or none of it. They find that neither individual- or group-level
feedback causes contributions to increase relative to full-information conditions. I build on
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these two papers by allowing subjects to choose the amount of information they will
acquire. In addition, this paper studies a sequential public goods game, which has not yet
been explored in the willful ignorance literature.
Finally, I consider the literature on public goods and group identity (For an in-depth
review, see Li 2020). Thus far, much of the literature has focused on natural group
identities. In a simultaneous lab experiment comparing the public goods contributions of
British and Italian subjects, Castro (2008) finds that British subjects contribute more to
public goods when they are matched with other British subjects, though contributions from
both British and Italian subjects decline when they are not matched with members of their
own ingroup. Li et al (2017) find, in a framed field experiment, that common community
identity influences subjects’ likelihood of contributing to public goods. The direction of
impact is sensitive to community context – when the primed identity has positive
connotations, giving increases (though insignificantly). Chang and Peisakhin (2019) find, in
a lab-in-the-field experiment, that priming subjects of different religious groups (Shia and
Sunni Muslims) by providing expert testimony about the benefits of intergroup
cooperation increases rates of unconditional cooperation (measured by a voting game), but
participation in an intergroup discussion about cooperation does not affect unconditional
cooperation. Neither intervention affects the rate of conditional cooperation (measured by
a public goods game). Charness and Villeval (2009) use both lab and lab-in-the-field
methods to compare the behavior of those under the age of 30 to those over the age of 50
using a series of games, including a public goods game. They find that seniors are more
cooperative than their younger counterparts in making contributions to team productions.
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II.3 Model
I use a group identity public goods model similar to that in Li et al (2017), incorporating
elements from a diagnostic utility model model similar to those by Bodner and Prelec
(2003) and Grossman and Van der Weele (2017). In these models, utility is said to be
divided into two aspects: “outcome” (utility from payouts and/or welfare) and “diagnostic”
(utility from self-observed beliefs about one’s type), and each aspect of the utility function
relates to a self: the “gut” self, which only maximizes own profit, and the “observer” self,
which updates beliefs. In addition, I incorporate elements similar to those used in the
group identity model in Chen and Li (2009).
II.3.1 Priors of the Model
Consider a diagnostic utility model. I begin with the most complicated case, where
agents face uncertainty and have preferences over social identity. Let 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +
𝜇𝑖
𝑛

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 , where 𝑒𝑖 represents the endowment of agent 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 denotes agent 𝑖’s contribution

to the public good, and 𝜇𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 = {𝜇0 = 0, . . . , 𝜇𝑛 = 𝛶} denotes agent 𝑖’s benefit from the
public good where 𝛶 gives the maximum benefit possible. Let 𝑞𝜎 be the total number of
signals acquired and let the cost of each signal be 𝑐. Further, let each agent receive some
𝑔

−𝑔

level of utility (or disutility) from the diagnostic parameters 𝜑𝑖 (𝛱𝑖 ) and 𝜌𝑖 (𝛱𝑖 ), where
𝛱𝑖 =

𝜇𝑖
𝑛

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 −

𝜇𝑗
𝑛

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 , which is the difference between agent 𝑖 and agent 𝑗’s benefit

from the public good, and the superscript 𝑔 (−𝑔) denotes whether the difference is
between contributions from the agent and a member of her ingroup (outgroup). Note that
𝑔

when 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇𝑗 , the result is a standard public goods game. Let 𝜑𝑖 (𝛱𝑖 ) denote diagnostic
−𝑔

utility from the agent’s actions towards her ingroup members and 𝜌𝑖 (𝛱𝑖 ) denote
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diagnostic utility from the agent’s actions towards her outgroup members. Assume 𝜑𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖 >
0 if 𝛱𝑖 ≤ 𝑘𝑖 and 𝛱𝑖 ≥ ℎ𝑖 , where 𝑘𝑖 is the threshold above which the agent experiences
𝑑𝜑

disutility from being selfish and ℎ𝑖 is the agent’s survival threshold, and that 𝑑𝛱 𝑔𝑖 > 0, but
𝑖

𝑑𝜌

𝑖
that 𝑑𝛱 −𝑔
< 0.
𝑖

This captures the intuition that increases in inequality with one’s ingroup members
will result in disutility that is increasing in payoff differences, while differences with
outgroup members has the opposite effect. Further, let the diagnostic parameter be
weighted by identity utility weight 𝑤(𝑟), where 0 ≤ 𝑤(𝑟) ≤ 1 and

𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑠

> 0 and depends on

the identification 𝑠 of agent 𝑖 with group 𝐺. This assumption captures the intuition that
some agents may feel more strongly about group identity than others. Further, assume that
𝑔

−𝑔

the values of 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇𝑗 (and therefore 𝛱𝑖 , 𝛱𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 and 𝜌𝑖 ) are unknown, but are expected
conditional on the agent’s current information set 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 = {𝑠0 , . . . , 𝑠𝑛 }. Agent 𝑖’s expected
utility is given by:
𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
𝐸𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 −
𝑛
𝑖=1

(1)

((𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]])
Assume further that the information set 𝑠𝑖 = {(𝑝1 𝜎1 ), . . . , (𝑝𝑖−1 𝜎𝑖−1 )} is the set of all
previously acquired signals (𝜎𝑖 ) about the value of agent 𝑖 and 𝑗’s benefits (𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇𝑗 ),
weighted by their accuracies (𝑝𝑖 ). Any given information set is therefore conditional on the
combination of signals drawn thus far.
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II.3.2 Information Acquisition
An agent will acquire information when the expected utility from doing so outweighs the
expected utility of stopping signal acquisition. For the sake of simplicity, define
(𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]] ≡ 𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ). This gives:
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖
]
])
(𝑠 )
(𝑠
)
𝑛 (𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 − 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 + 𝛷𝑖 𝑖 − 𝛷𝑖 𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ≥ 𝑐 ≡ 𝑐
𝛼
(1 + 𝑞𝜎 )

(2)

Therefore, agent 𝑖 will acquire an additional signal when the cost of any given signal is less
than the increase in expected utility from doing so, up to cost 𝑐𝛼 .
II.3.2.1 Beliefs
Agents in this model update according to standard Bayesian principles after each
signal draw. Upon drawing any additional signal, agent 𝑖 updates her beliefs about the
value of 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇𝑗 according to Bayes’ rule:
(3)

𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) ∝ 𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 |𝜇𝑖 )
Similarly, for another agent’s benefit:

(4)

𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) ∝ 𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 |𝜇𝑖 )
1

The unconditional probability of any given 𝜇𝑖 or 𝜇𝑗 occurring is given by 𝜇 (recall
𝑛

that 𝜇𝑛 is the number of benefit multipliers in set 𝑀). Similarly, let the unconditional
1

probability encountering any information set be given by . Further, let the prior
𝑠𝑛

probability 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 |𝜇𝑖 ) be given by the CDF 𝐻𝑖 = ℎ𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖−1 , . . . , 𝑠0 ) - that is, the accuracy
of any given information is a function of past signals. Similarly, 𝐻𝑗 = ℎ𝑗 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖−1 , . . . , 𝑠0 ) gives
the prior probability function for 𝜇𝑗 . Further, assume

𝑑𝐻𝑖
𝑑𝑠𝑖

> 0 and

𝑑𝐻𝑗
𝑑𝑠𝑖

> 0. This yields:
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𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) =

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
𝜇𝑛

(5)

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗
𝜇𝑛

(6)

For the agent’s own benefit and:
𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) =

For any other agent 𝑗’s benefit. Further, let the prior probability functions for 𝜇−𝑖 and 𝜇−𝑗
be given by (1 − 𝐻𝑖 ) and (1 − 𝐻𝑗 ). This yields the expectations:
𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = 𝜇𝑖

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑖 )
+ 𝜇−𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛

(7)

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗
𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑗 )
+ 𝜇−𝑗
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛

(8)

For the agent’s own benefit and:
𝐸[𝜇𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = 𝜇𝑗

For the other agent 𝑗’s benefit. Recalling that 𝛱𝑖 =

𝜇𝑖
𝑛

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 −

𝑛

𝜇𝑗
𝑛

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 , this yields:

𝑛

𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] ∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝐸[𝜇𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

(9)

𝑖=1

Plugging in (7) and (8) into (9):
𝑛

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑖 )
𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = (𝜇𝑖
+ 𝜇−𝑖
) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑖=1

𝑛

−(𝜇𝑗

(10)

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗
𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑗 )
+ 𝜇−𝑗
) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑖=1

To denote whether the expected difference 𝛱𝑖 is with an ingroup or outgroup
𝑔

member, let 𝛱𝑖 denote the difference in total benefit with another ingroup member and let
−𝑔

𝛱𝑖

denote the difference in benefits with an outgroup member. This yields:
𝑔

𝑔

𝑔

𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) ∝ 𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 |𝛱𝑖 )

(11)
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for ingroup members and:
−𝑔

−𝑔

−𝑔

𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) ∝ 𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 |𝛱𝑖 )

(12)

For outgroup members. Plugging in (10) to equations (11) and (12) and expanding yields:
𝑛

𝑔

𝑔
𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑖 ) 𝑔
∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = (𝜇𝑖
+ 𝜇−𝑖
) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑖=1

−(𝜇𝑗

𝑔
𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗

𝜇𝑛

+ 𝜇−𝑗

𝑠𝑛 (1 −

𝑔
𝐻𝑗 )

𝜇𝑛

𝑛

(13)

) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

For ingroup members and:
−𝑔

−𝑔
𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = (𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑛
−𝑔

−(𝜇𝑗

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗
𝜇𝑛

𝑛

𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑖 )−𝑔
+ 𝜇−𝑖
) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝑖=1

𝑛

−𝑔

+ 𝜇−𝑗

𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑗 )
𝜇𝑛

(14)

) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

For outgroup members.
If equations (13) and (14) ≤ 𝑘 and equations (13) and (14) ≥ ℎ, then 𝜑𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖 > 0. Otherwise,
𝑔

−𝑔

𝜑𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖 < 0. However, I need 𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ). Rearranging equations
(14) and (15) gives:
𝑛

𝑔

𝑔
𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

𝑔
𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗
𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = (𝜇𝑖
− 𝜇𝑗
) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑖=1

+(𝜇−𝑖

𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑖
𝜇𝑛

)𝑔

− 𝜇−𝑗

𝑠𝑛 (1 −

𝑔
𝐻𝑗 )

𝜇𝑛

𝑛

(15)

) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

For ingroup members and:
−𝑔

−𝑔

−𝑔
𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖
∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] = (𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑛

− 𝜇𝑗

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑗
𝜇𝑛

𝑛

) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

(16)
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𝑛

−𝑔

𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑗 )
𝑠𝑛 (1 − 𝐻𝑖 )−𝑔
+(𝜇−𝑖
− 𝜇−𝑗
) ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑖=1

For outgroup members. From the above equations, it is clear that:
𝑔

𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) =

𝑔

𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖 − 𝐻𝑗 )

(17)

𝜇𝑛

For ingroup members and:
−𝑔

−𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) =

𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖

−𝑔

− 𝐻𝑗 )

(18)

𝜇𝑛
𝑔

−𝑔

For outgroup members. Further, the probabilities of 𝛱−𝑖 and 𝛱−𝑖 are given by:
𝑔

𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝛱−𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) =

𝑔

𝑠𝑛 ((1 − 𝐻𝑖 ) − (1 − 𝐻𝑗 ))
𝜇𝑛

(19)

For ingroup members and:
−𝑔

−𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝛱−𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 ) =

−𝑔

𝑠𝑛 ((1 − 𝐻𝑖 ) − (1 − 𝐻𝑗 ))
𝜇𝑛

(19)

The model, however, also depends on the expectation of the diagnostic parameter, which is
𝑔

itself conditional on the expected value of 𝛱𝑖 . Assume agents update their beliefs about 𝜑𝑖
𝑔

in a similar fashion to those about 𝛱𝑖 :
𝑔
𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝜑𝑖 | (𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 )) ∝ 𝑃𝑟(𝜑𝑖 ) ⋅ 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 )|𝜑𝑖 )

(20)

1

The unconditional probability of 𝜑𝑖 is 𝜑 . Plugging this in to equation (20) yields:
𝑛

𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝜑𝑖 | (𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 )) =

1
𝑔
|𝑠
𝜑𝑛 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 )|𝜑𝑖 )
𝑔

𝑔

𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖 − 𝐻𝑗 )
𝜇𝑛

(21)

𝑔

Further, define the prior probability function of 𝜑𝑖 as based on prior beliefs about 𝛱𝑖 :

74

𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 )|𝜑𝑖 ) =

𝑔
𝑠 (𝐻𝑖
𝑔 𝑛
𝜁𝑖 (

𝑔

− 𝐻𝑗 )

𝜇𝑛

(22)

𝑔

) ≡ 𝑍𝑖

Plugging this in gives:
𝑔

𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝜑𝑖 | (𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 )) =

𝑍𝑖 𝜇𝑛
𝑔

(23)

𝑔

𝜑𝑛 𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖 − 𝐻𝑗 )

Similarly:
𝑔

(1 − 𝑍𝑖 )𝜇𝑛

𝑔

𝑃𝑟(𝜑−𝑖 | (𝑃𝑟(𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 )) =

𝑔

(24)

𝑔

𝜑𝑛 𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖 − 𝐻𝑗 )

Combining equations (23) and (24) yields:
𝑔

𝑔

𝑔
𝐸 [𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖

∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]] = 𝜑𝑖

𝑍𝑖 𝜇𝑛
𝑔

+ 𝜑−𝑖

−𝑔

+ 𝜌−𝑖

𝑔

𝜑𝑛 𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖 − 𝐻𝑗 )

(1 − 𝑍𝑖 )𝜇𝑛
𝑔

(25)

𝑔

𝜑𝑛 𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖 − 𝐻𝑗 )

Similarly, the expected value for 𝜌𝑖 is given by:
−𝑔

−𝑔

−𝑔

𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]] = 𝜌𝑖

𝑍𝑖 𝜇𝑛
−𝑔

𝜌𝑛 𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖

− 𝐻𝑗 )

(1 − 𝑍𝑖 )𝜇𝑛
−𝑔

𝜌𝑛 𝑠𝑛 (𝐻𝑖

−𝑔

− 𝐻𝑗 )

(26)

Using these expected values, I can now calculate the agents’ contribution behavior.
II.3.3 Contributions
An agent will contribute an extra amount 𝜓𝑖 to the public good if the expected utility
from doing so is greater than the expected utility from not doing so. What level of benefit
will be required for agents to contribute? Recalling that 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
𝑛

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 gives:

𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
(𝜓𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ) − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝛷𝑖+𝜓 (𝑠𝑖 )
𝑒𝑖 − (𝑥𝑖 + 𝜓𝑖 ) +
𝑛
𝑖=1

(27)
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𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
≥ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 )
𝑛
𝑖=1

Solving equation (27) for 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ] gives:
𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ] ≥ 𝑛 +
Substituting in 𝜇𝑖

𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖−1
𝜇𝑛

+ 𝜇−𝑖

𝑛𝛷𝑖+𝜓 (𝑠𝑖 ) − 𝑛𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 )
𝜓𝑖

𝑠𝑛 (1−𝐻𝑖−1 )
𝜇𝑛

(28)

= 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ] and solving for 𝜇𝑖 yields:

𝜇𝑛 (𝑛𝛷𝑖+𝜓 (𝑠𝑖 ) − 𝑛𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ))
(1 − 𝐻𝑖−1 )
𝑛𝜇𝑛
+
− 𝜇−𝑖
≤ 𝜇𝑖 ≡ 𝜇𝛼
𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖−1
𝜓𝑖 𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖−1
𝐻𝑖−1

(29)

Therefore, it is a best response for agent 𝑖 to contribute to the good when 𝜇𝑖 ≥ 𝜇𝛼 ,
and free-ride otherwise. Note that this solution is generalizable to all contribution cases: if
∑𝑛−1
= 0, then equation (27) becomes:
𝑖
𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
(𝜓𝑖 + ∑ 0) − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝛷𝑖+𝜓 (𝑠𝑖 )
𝑒𝑖 − (0 + 𝜓𝑖 ) +
𝑛
𝑖=1

𝑛

≥ 𝑒𝑖 − 0 +

(30)

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
∑ 0 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 )
𝑛
𝑖=1

Simplifying yields the same result as equation (29).
II.3.4 Special Cases of the Model
To predict expected treatment effects, I use three special cases of the model.
Interestingly, cross-comparing treatments in each case boils down to a ratio comparison
between actual (or expected) diagnostic utilities and the ratio of identity weights.
II.3.4.1 Certainty, No Identity
Consider the simplest special case: that agents act as individuals under full certainty
about benefits. If agents operate under full certainty, the utility function becomes:
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𝑛

𝜇𝑖
𝐸𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑛𝜌𝑖
𝑛

(31)

𝑖=1

In this case, there is no threshold cost since there are no signals to acquire. Comparing
contributions becomes similar to a normal public goods game. It is a best response for an
agent to contribute an amount 𝜓 if:
𝑛

𝑛

𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑖
𝑒𝑖 − (𝑥𝑖 + 𝜓𝑖 ) + (𝜓𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ) − 𝑛𝜌𝑖+𝜓 ≥ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑛𝜌𝑖
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1

(32)

𝑖=1

Solving for 𝜇𝑖 :
𝑛(𝜓𝑖 + 𝑛(𝜌𝑖+𝜓 − 𝜌𝑖 ))
≤ 𝜇 𝑖 ≡ 𝜇𝛾
𝜓𝑖

(33)

As before, it is a best response for an agent to contribute if 𝜇𝑖 > 𝜇𝛾 .
II.3.4.2 Certainty, Identity
Perhaps the most intuitive special case of the model is when there is no uncertainty
about benefits, but when social identities do exist. The utility function becomes:
𝑛

𝜇𝑖
𝑢(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 − ((𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))𝜌𝑖 − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)𝜑𝑖 )
𝑛

(34)

𝑖=1

As before, there will be no threshold cost, since there is no uncertainty. Solving for the
threshold benefit gives the agent’s best response:
𝑛

𝜇𝑖
𝑒𝑖 − (𝑥𝑖 + 𝜓𝑖 ) + (𝜓𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ) − ((𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))𝜌𝑗+𝜓 − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)𝜑𝑖+𝜓 )
𝑛
𝑖=1

𝑛

𝜇𝑖
≥ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 − ((𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))𝜌𝑖 − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)𝜑𝑖 )
𝑛
𝑖=1

Solving for 𝜇𝑖 yields:

(35)
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𝑛(𝜓𝑖 + (𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))(𝜌𝑗+𝜓 − 𝜌𝑖 ) − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)(𝜑𝑖+𝜓 − 𝜑𝑖 ))
≤ 𝜇𝑖 ≡ 𝜇 𝜅
𝜓𝑖

(36)

Therefore, it is a best response for an agent to contribute if 𝜇𝑖 > 𝜇𝜅 .
II.3.4.3 Uncertainty, No Identity
Another special case of the model occurs when uncertainty exists, but no group
identity exists. The utility function becomes:
𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
𝑢(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 ) = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]]
𝑛

(37)

𝑖=1

It is a best response for an agent to contribute an amount 𝜓𝑖 if:
𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
𝑒𝑖 − (𝜓𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 ) +
((𝜓𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ) − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑗+𝜓 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗+𝜓 |𝑠𝑖 ]]
𝑛
𝑖=1

𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
≥ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]]
𝑛

(38)

𝑖=1

Solving for 𝜇𝑖 gives:
𝑛𝜇𝑛 (𝜓𝑖 + 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑗+𝜓 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗+𝜓 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]])
𝜓𝑖 𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖−1

− 𝜇−𝑖

(1 − 𝐻𝑖−1 )
≥ 𝜇𝑖 ≡ 𝜇𝜂 (39)
𝐻𝑖−1

As before, contributing constitutes a best response if 𝜇𝑖 > 𝜇 + μ𝜂 . Further, it is useful to
examine when agents will acquire information. An agent will acquire information if:
𝑛

𝐸𝑈𝑖 =

𝑒𝑖𝜎

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]
− 𝑥𝑖 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖 − (𝑞𝜎 + 1)𝑐 − 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]])
𝑛
𝑖=1

𝑛

𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]
≥ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 +
∑ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐 − 𝑛𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]])
𝑛
𝑖=1

Where 𝑒𝑖𝜎 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑞𝜎 𝑐. Solving for 𝑐 gives:

(40)
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∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖
(𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] − 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]) + 𝑛 (𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]])
𝑛
(𝑞𝜎 + 1)

(41)

≥ 𝑐 ≡ 𝑐𝜂
II.3.5 Nash Equilibria
Multiple Nash Equilibria exist. If 𝜇𝑖 < 𝜇𝛼 for all agents, then all agents contributing
𝑥𝑖 = 0 constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. If one agent with 𝜇𝑖 > 𝜇𝛼 contributes and others do
not, this constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if the diagnostic benefit to members of agent 𝑖’s
ingroup outweighs the diagnostic cost from members of agent 𝑖’s outgroup, but the
diagnostic cost from all agents −𝑖’s outgroup outweighs the diagnostic benefit from agents
−𝑖’s ingroup. Further, there exists a Nash Equilibrium where all agents contribute, which
occurs iff the diagnostic benefit to all agents from contributing to their ingroup outweighs
the diagnostic cost to all agents of contributing to their outgroup.
II.3.6 Hypotheses
From the model outlined above, I offer the following hypotheses.
II.3.6.1 Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis describes the treatment difference along the group dimension between
cases where subjects operate in an environment of complete certainty.
Hypothesis 1a: Under certainty, contributions will be higher with induced group identity than
with no group identity if subjects have preferences such that they experience utility from
contributing to ingroup members and disutility from contributing to outgroup members, and
vice versa.
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Hypothesis 1b: Under certainty, contributions will be lower with induced group identity than
with no group identity if subjects have preferences such that they experience utility from both
contributing to ingroup members and to outgroup members, and vice versa.
Support. I compare 𝜇𝜅 to 𝜇𝛾 . Contributions should be higher with identity if:
𝑛(𝜓𝑖 + (𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))(𝜌𝑗+𝜓 − 𝜌𝑖 ) − 𝑔𝑤(𝑟)(𝜑𝑖+𝜓 − 𝜑𝑖 )) 𝑛(𝜓𝑖 + 𝑛(𝜌𝑖+𝜓 − 𝜌𝑖 )) (42
≥
𝜓𝑖
𝜓𝑖
)
Solving for the effect of group identity preferences yields:
𝑔𝑤(𝑟)
𝑛 − (𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))

≥

𝜌𝑖+𝜓 − 𝜌𝑖
𝜑𝑖 − 𝜑𝑖+𝜓

(43)

That is, 𝜇𝜅 will be greater than 𝜇𝛾 when the ratio of reduction in disutility from inequality
from outgroup members to ingroup members is less than ratio of the agent’s ingroup
affinity (𝑤(𝑟)) to outgroup affinity (1 − 𝑤(𝑟)) weighted by group composition.
Note that the denominator of the fraction above will always be less than 1; the value
of the numerator is ambiguous (𝑤(𝑟) < 1 and 𝑔 ≥ 1). However, if the number of ingroup
members (𝑔) is less than the reciprocal of 𝑤(𝑟), the numerator will be less than 1 (and
therefore the whole fraction will be less than one). This is highly likely to be the case - for
example, an agent with 2 ingroup members must have a group attachment of less than 0.5
for the entire numerator to be greater than one. This is significant because a group
attachment of less than 0.5 would imply that agents feel more attached to members of their
outgroup than members of their ingroup. For purposes of this experiment, it will be
unlikely that there is a scenario where the numerator is greater than one.
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II.3.6.2 Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis describes the treatment difference in contributions along the
group dimension between cases where subjects operate in an uncertain environment:
Hypothesis 2a: Under uncertainty, contributions will be higher with induced group identity
than with no group identity if subjects believe that they will experience an increase in utility
from contributing to their outgroup that is greater than the reduction in disutility from their
ingroup.
Hypothesis 2b: Under uncertainty, contributions will be lower with induced group identity
than with no group identity if subjects believe that they will experience an increase in utility
from contributing to their outgroup that is less than the reduction in disutility from their
ingroup.
Support: Using a similar procedure to the previous section, I compare 𝜇𝜂 to 𝜇𝛼 . The rate of
contributions will be higher under identity if:
𝑛𝜇𝑛 (𝜓𝑖 + 𝑛 (𝐸 [𝜌𝑗+𝜓 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗+𝜓 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]]))

(1 − 𝐻𝑖−1 )
𝜓𝑖 𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖−1
𝐻𝑖−1
𝑛𝜇𝑛 (𝜓𝑖 + 𝛷𝑖+𝜓 (𝑠𝑖 ) − 𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ))
(1 − 𝐻𝑖−1 )
≥
− 𝜇−𝑖
𝜓𝑖 𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑖−1
𝐻𝑖−1
− 𝜇−𝑖

(44)

Solving as before for the effect of identity:
𝐸 [𝜌𝑗+𝜓 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗+𝜓 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]]
𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜑𝑖+𝜓 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖+𝜓 |𝑠𝑖 ]]

≥

𝑔𝑤(𝑟)
𝑛 − (𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))

(45)

Therefore, when the ratio of the expected changes in disutility is greater than the
ratio of the identity weights, 𝜇𝜂 > 𝜇𝛼 . If the reverse is true, 𝜇𝜂 < 𝜇𝛼 .
Again, it is highly likely that the right hand side will less than one (any subject with
ingroup attachment will have weight 𝑤(𝑟) > 0.5.This implies that the threshold benefit
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under uncertainty with no group manipulation will be greater than the threshold benefit
under uncertainty with group manipulation if two conditions are met: first, the disutility
reduction from contributing to the agent’s outgroup must be greater than the disutility
reduction from contributing to the agent’s ingroup, and both reductions must occur such
that the left-hand side is positive.
II.3.6.3 Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis describes the treatment difference in information acquisition
along the group dimension between cases where subjects operate in an uncertain
environment.
Hypothesis 3a: Under uncertainty, search rates will be higher with induced group identity
than with no group identity if subjects believe that they will experience an increase in utility
from their current contribution outgroup that is greater than the reduction in disutility from
their ingroup.
Hypothesis 3b: Under uncertainty, search rates will be lower with induced group identity than
with no group identity if subjects believe that they will experience an increase in utility from
their current contribution their outgroup that is less than the reduction in disutility from their
ingroup.
Hypothesis 3c: Under uncertainty, contributions and information acquisition will exhibit a
substitution effect.
Support. Information acquisition will be greater if there is no identity manipulation if 𝑐𝜂 >
𝑐𝛼 :
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∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖
]
])
𝑛 (𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 − 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 + 𝑛 (𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]])
(𝑞𝜎 + 1)
𝑛
∑𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖
(𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ] − 𝐸[𝜇𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]) + 𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ) − 𝛷𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 )
≥ 𝑛
(1 + 𝑞𝜎 )

(46)

Solving for the effects of identity:
𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]]
𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]] − 𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]]

≥

𝑔𝑤(𝑟)
𝑛 − (𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))

(47)

The movement here is opposite to the moves above - notice that the identity ratio
must now be less than the ratio amount subjects believe their disutility will be reduced
from their outgroup after acquiring a signal to the utility they believe they will gain from
their ingroup after acquiring the signal. This also implies that information acquisition and
contributions under uncertainty will exhibit a substitution effect.
II.3.6.4 Behavioral Hypotheses
In addition to these hypotheses, I offer a behavioral hypothesis rooted in the literature:
Behavioral Hypothesis 1: Contributions will be lower under uncertainty than under certainty.
This is also implied by Hypothesis 3c above.
II.4 Experimental Design
I use a 2 x 2 design to test my hypotheses. Each treatment consists of four stages:
the group formation stage, the group priming stage, the gameplay stage, and the
questionnaire.The treatment dimensions are Identity-No Identity and CertaintyUncertainty. Payouts in the experiment are made in Experimental Currency Units, which
are converted to dollars at a conversion rate of 20 ECU = $1.
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II.4.1 The Identity-No Identity Manipulation
The first two stages manipulate the Identity-No Identity dimension of the
treatments. In "Identity" treatments (Identity x Certainty and Identity x Uncertainty,
hereafter I x C and I x U), I induce group identity using a similar procedure to Chen and Li
(2009). In the group formation stage, subjects are shown a series of nine paintings by two
similar painters, Klee and Kadinsky. Subjects are asked which of the paintings they prefer.
Subjects who exhibit preferences for Klee’s works are put into the "Green Group" and those
who prefer Kadinsky are put into the "Gold Group."
Then, subjects enter the group priming stage, where they are given the opportunity
to talk about the paintings and guess which of a new set of paintings are made by which
artist after being shown a sample. Subjects then submit guesses about each painting, and
are paid 7 ECU for each painting they guess correctly. In the "No Identity" treatments (No
Identity x Certainty and No Identity x Uncertainty, hereafter NI x C and NI x U respectively),
subjects play as individuals with no group inducement. Subjects still go through the group
formation and priming procedure on their own, and it is not used for the rest of the
experiment.
II.4.2 The Certainty-Uncertainty Manipulation
The gameplay stage manipulates the Certainty-Uncertainty dimension of the design.
In both manipulations, the gameplay stage is consists of 20 periods, each lasting 120
seconds. period varies the group composition between ingroup and outgroup members (in
I x C). Subjects always know the composition of the group and which subjects belong to
their ingroup and outgroup. In each period, four subjects play a simultaneous, one-shot
public goods game, with each subject’s payoff given by:
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𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ]] − 𝐸 [𝜌𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑗 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]]
𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ∪ 𝜎𝑖 ]] − 𝐸[𝜑𝑖 |𝐸[𝛱𝑖 |𝑠𝑖 ]]

≥

𝑔𝑤(𝑟)
𝑛 − (𝑛 − 𝑔)(1 − 𝑤(𝑟))

(48)

The endowment $5 taken out of the subjects’ show-up fee of $7. Let 𝑥𝑖 be the
subject’s own contribution to the public good, which was framed as a contribution to a
"general investment account." Further, let 𝑞𝜎 and 𝑐 = 1 ECU denote the number of signals
acquired and the cost of each signal, as before. Further, let the benefit of the public good
𝜇𝑖 ∈ {𝜇1 = 2, 𝜇2 = 3, 𝜇3 = 5, 𝜇4 = 6} and then split equally between the players. I do not
use 𝜇𝑖 = 4 as this would give the point where subjects in a group of four would be
indifferent between contributing and not contributing in a standard goods game. All
benefits are used with replacement, so it is possible for multiple players to have the same
benefit. At the end of each round, subjects are shown the results of the round, and proceed
to the next round. Subjects are paid for one randomly-selected round out of the 20 rounds
in the gameplay stage. The manipulation occurs on whether subjects know their benefit
(and the benefit of others) from the public good.
II.4.3 The Certainty Treatments
In the "Certainty" treatments (I x C and NI x C) subjects know both their own benefit
from the public good and the other players’ benefits. Both prior to and after making their
own contribution, subjects are asked to submit their beliefs about the probability of each
other subject contributing to the public good using a slider, with "0" being 0% likely and
"100" being 100% likely. Subjects are paid for the accuracy of their guess using the
quadratic scoring rule (and this is known), for a maximum of 1 ECU possible for each
correct answer.
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II.4.4 The Uncertainty Treatments
In the Uncertainty treatments (I x U and NI x U), subjects choose whether to receive
a signal about the other players’ benefits. Before acquiring a signal, subjects are shown the
cost of doing so. The cost of a signal is paid out of the subjects’ endowments. The round
proceeds as follows. First, I elicit subjects’ beliefs about the likelihood of other players
contributing (as in the "Certainty" treatments), as well as the subjects’ beliefs of what
benefit they think each other participant will be in the game and whether the signal they
see is accurate (this is also incentivized using the QSR). Subjects can then choose to receive
a signal about the other players’ benefits, or not to acquire a signal (they may choose to
stop acquiring signals at any point during the round). This information is displayed in a
distinct “information box,” which is described in more detail below. After acquiring a signal,
subjects perform the belief elicitation task again, and are asked if they would like to acquire
another signal. Subjects make a hypothetical contribution after each signal acquired, which
becomes binding once subjects stop acquiring information. If subjects choose not to acquire
any information, they make a one-shot, binding choice of what amount to contribute to the
public good.
The “information box” allows me to test my hypotheses directly. Subjects are told
that the signal is "true" or "random" with 50-50 odds. The signal accuracy is proxied by two
jars, "True" and "Random," filled with red and white balls. Though the number of balls in
each jar changed from round to round, the signal accuracy was always fixed at 75%.
Subjects are told that the number of balls in each jar would change from round to round,
but not the fixed accuracy. To draw a ball, subjects click a button labeled, "Draw Ball". Upon
clicking the button, subjects are shown what color ball they have drawn, as well as a
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message about the other subjects’ benefits from the public good. For example, a subject
might see the signal: "Player Green 1 will have the total amount of the general investment
account multiplied by 5. Player Gold 1 will have the total amount of the general investment
account multiplied by 2. Player Gold 2 will have the total amount of the general investment
account multiplied by 3."
Subjects know that after the investment account is multiplied by the benefit, the
amount will be divided by the number of players; this was not included as a portion of the
uncertainty. All balls are drawn with replacement. As in Grossman (2014) and Van der
Weele (2014), ignorance must be actively chosen. This is accomplished by a button at the
bottom of the screen labeled “Stop Drawing Balls.” The only way that subjects make a
binding contribution is if they click this button, at which point it and the information box
disappears for the rest of the period. Subjects are informed that the other players will
never be aware of the number of signals they chose to acquire. In the event that the round
times out before a subject has made a final decision, their last contribution will be binding.
The introduction of a random signal is what allows subjects to self-deceive. Subjects
may now freely assume, upon seeing an unfavorable signal, that the unfavorable signal is
just "noise" and that the true state of the world is, in fact, something else. This also works in
reverse: if subjects see a favorable signal, they may now assume that the signal is "true"
and therefore may act in accordance with it. Therefore, subjects who already intend to freeride may use this second phenomenon to self-justify contributing nothing: "Well, it looks
like my partner didn’t contribute anything, so I don’t need to contribute anything either!"
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II.4.5 Payouts and Experimental Procedures
Subjects are told that they will be paid based on the outcome in one randomly
selected round in addition to their show-up fee of $7. After the experiment, subjects
completed a questionnaire that included demographic information, an incentivized Holt
and Laury (2002) test of risk preferences, an incentivized, 6-item Cognitive Reflection Test
using questions from Primi et al. (2016) questions from the Global Preference Survey about
altruism, other-regarding behavior, fairness, and risk preferences (Falk, et al., 2018; Falk et
al., 2016), questions from the International Personality Item Pool “Big 5” personality
survey (Goldberg et al., 1999; Goldberg et al., 2006) and a Locus of Control questionnaire
(Rotter, 1966). The demographic questionnaire asked subjects for their ethnicity, age,
gender identity, years of education, their academic college at the University of Arkansas,
their major, and whether the subject grew up in the United States. The CRT questionnaire
from Primi et al. includes questions from the original CRT first published by Frederick
(2005).
The maximum possible payout for each subject was $35.95 ($30 from all players
contributing to the public goods game with the maximum MPCR of 1.5 + $1.5 from the
belief elicitation prcedures + $3.85 from Holt and Laury + $0.60 from the CRT). and the
minimum possible payout for each subject was $5.10 ($5 show-up fee + $0.10 from Holt
and Laury). The experiment was coded in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was conducted in
the Business Behavioral Research Laboratory at the University of Arkansas. Each session
was scheduled for 120 minutes.
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Chapter III: Risk Preferences and Reform Paths: Experimental Evidence
III.1 Introduction
Land reform - the transfer of land from a small aristocratic class to a large
sharecropper class - has long been a contentious topic in developing countries around the
globe. Horowitz (1993) provides a theoretical model of land reform. Prior to 1993, more
than three-quarters of the world’s populace lived in countries that have undergone land
reform since World War II and, since then, land reform has been implemented in South
Africa, Venezuela, and many other African and South American countries. Although land
reform motivates the model, it can be applied in any case where there is a fixed amount of
an asset that is split between two players. In addition, a test of this model allows me to
contribute to the rapidly expanding experimental literature on conflicts. Most of this
literature, such as Kimbrough, Shermata, and Shields (2012) and Herbst, Konrad, and
Morath (2017) focuses on either conflict avoidance or conflict resolution, without
examining the causes of such conflicts. To my knowledge, mine is the first paper to
experimentally examine the causes of conflict directly in the laboratory.
Horowitz’s model gives a set of scenarios (“safe reform paths”) under which conflict
between parties should not happen, conditional on risk preferences. For risk-neutral
subjects, there is a unique safe reform path. For risk-averse subjects, there is a set of safe
reform paths that includes the risk-neutral path. Each period, subjects can choose whether
to accept or reject the reform path. Once a subject accepts a reform path, her expected
utility from continuing to accept the reform path is greater than her expected utility from
subsequently rejecting it (and vice versa). As such, behavioral violations of this model give
me a way to examine why subjects who should not ever enter into conflict choose to do so. I
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wish to answer the following research questions. First, conditional on risk preferences and
path type, will risk-neutral and risk-averse subjects choose to accept the safe reform paths
outlined in Horowitz? Second, if subjects do not accept the safe reform paths when theory
predicts that they should, what factors cause them to do so?
Using a within-subjects experimental design in which subjects are randomly paired
for 40 three- or four-period blocks, I find the risk-neutral path is not always accepted, the
risk-averse path is not always accepted, and rejections are driven by loss aversion and
subjects do not behaviorally adhere to expected utility theory, as they often choose to reject
the reform path in the second or third periods of the block after accepting the path in the
first or second period of the block.
III.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the growing literature on war and conflict in economics.2
Most of the literature has focused on conflict prevention. Tingley and Walter (2011) find
that cheap talk can deter conflict from occurring in an entry-exit game, and Cason,
Shermata and Zhang (2012) find that inter-group communication in a weak-link game
decreases the rate of destructive competition. Kimbrough and Sheremata (2014) use a
modified form of the ultimatum game to investigate whether side-payments from the
proposer to the responder can prevent the responder from entering into conflict with the
proposer. They find that, when proposers earn the right to make side-payments to
receivers, proposers offer higher payments with greater frequency over time, and this
increases the rate of conflict resolution. McBride and Skaperdas (2014) find that, with

2

Kimbrough, Laughren, and Sheremata (2017) provide a review of the relevant literature on this
topic.
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sufficiently high discount factors in an arms-race game, conflict is an equilibrium as the
future becomes more important.
Kimbrough, Sheremata, and Shields (2014) (hereafter KSS) and Herbst, Konrad, and
Morath (2017) (hereafter HKM) use a framework similar to the one in this paper to
examine conflict avoidance. In KSS, two parties that are considering entering into conflict
over a given asset may choose to appeal to an “oracle” (a coin flip) that will randomly
allocate the asset to the winner of the coin toss, or enter into a costly conflict. They offer
two treatments that make use of the oracle: balanced and unbalanced. In the “balanced”
case, both parties have equal strength, while in the “unbalanced” case, one party is stronger
than the other. They find that the expenditures on conflict are higher in the balanced case
than the unbalanced case, though the “oracle” device increases surplus in both cases. HKM
investigate the difference between direct bargaining between asymmetric agents over an
asset and bargaining via a mediator who makes an offer that both parties must accept in
order to avoid conflict. Both parties are endowed randomly with a certain level of conflict
ability, which in turn drives their probabilities of victory in the lottery. They find that, in
the mediated treatment, increases in the imbalance of power do not lead to higher conflict
rates, and conflict is typically triggered by the player who is disadvantaged in the conflict.
However, there is still a significant rate of conflict in the mediated treatment.
My research differs from KSS and HKM in a few ways. First, neither model generates
a unique safe reform path based on risk preferences, while the model I use does. Second,
where Horowitz gradually adjusts players’ allocations over several periods of time and
never uses the reform path to allocate all of the asset to one player or the other, KSS use a
coin flip for the reallocation and one player “wins” the entire asset and HKM uses 30
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rounds of one-shot games, though they allow for a partial division of the asset. Third,
neither KSS nor HKM allows for a reversion to the status quo, as is allowed in Horowitz.
Finally, most existing papers in this literature (including KSS and HKM) focus primarily on
the resolution of conflict rather than the causes of conflict itself. This paper uses a model
that, conditional on risk preferences, gives a conflict-free option which subjects should
always choose, allowing me to examine the behavioral causes of conflicts that result in the
specific context of this model.
III. 3 Theory
I consider the model presented by Horowitz (1993). The game is played as follows.
There are three players: A, B, and the social planner. There exists a fixed amount of land,
which is allocated between them at each time period. Let α𝑡 be player A’s endowment of
land at time t. I consider the initial state ℎ0 to be given and define a t history for each time
period, ℎ𝑡 ≡ {ℎ0 , … , ℎ𝑡−1 }, and consider the set of histories 𝐻𝑡 for the set of all t histories.
This model guarantees a unique “safe reform plan” (a plan that avoids conflict) when
considered between two risk-neutral agents (see Horowitz section I.C for proof).
A reform plan is given as a sequence of mappings that govern the evolution of
landholdings. During each period, the players choose whether to accept or reject the
reform. If either player rejects the reform, conflict ensues with a lottery determining the
outcome. Possible outcomes are: A-victory, B-victory, or the status quo, and are associated
with probabilities π𝐴 , π𝐵 , and π𝑄 . All three probabilities are known to both players and are
constant throughout the game. An agent who is victorious in a conflict at time t enters time
t+1 in possession of all land. Under the status quo outcome, both parties enter time t+1
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with their t endowments, and the reform process continues. With risk-neutral agents, a
unique safe reform plan exists and is given by:
σ(α) = πα + απ𝑄

(1)

1 − σ(α) = πβ + (1 − α)π𝑄

(2)

For player A and:

For player B, where σ(α) denotes the reform plan with respect to player A’s landholdings.
The intuition is straightforward: for a safe reform plan to be feasible, the expected utility of
each agent from the land reform path must be less than the expected utility from conflict.
Equations (1) and (2) give the unique safe reform path out of the set of all reform paths,
both static and dynamic. Further, (1) can be extended to show player A’s allocation of land
at time t (with player B in possession of the remaining land):
α𝑡 =

π𝐴
π𝐴
)
+ π𝑡𝑄 (α0 −
π𝐴 + π𝐵
π𝐴 + π𝐵

(3)

A unique feature of this model is that the probabilities of each player’s victory and the
status quo resulting are independent of land allocation; however, it must also be true that
the probabilities of victory for both players may not exactly equal their endowments of
land. In this case, there is no safe reform path. In addition, though the game in Horowitz is a
dynamic game, the safe reform plan devolves to a stationary game (see Horowitz,
Proposition 1). It is important to note that the social planner in Horowitz is a
“disinterested” social planner that is only concerned with finding a safe reform path.
Expected profits are given by:
𝑉(σ(α)) ≥ π𝑄 𝑉(α) + π𝐴 𝑉(1) + π𝐵 𝑉(0)
and

(4)
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𝑊(σ(α)) ≥ π𝑄 𝑊(α) + π𝐴 𝑊(1) + π𝐵 𝑊(0)

(5)

For players A and B, respectively, where V(●) and W(●) are the Bellman utility functions of
players A and B, respectively.
In addition, “intermediate-term” reforms can also exist. This occurs particularly
when agents are risk averse in land. If this occurs, there are multiple safe-reform plans (See
Horowitz, Proposition 2). The Pareto-optimal reform available in this case is the riskneutral solution, where the sum of all asset holdings equals one. In addition, Horowitz
demonstrates that any allocation where Player A and Player B’s new allocations do not sum
to one is a safe reform plan. This results from strictly concave utility requiring two reform
plans, which cause the sum of the utilities of each agent of their allocation along the reform
paths to equal 1. This implies that there is space between the "boundary plans" (which are
the absolute minimum offers each agent will accept), which means that multiple safe
reform plans must exist.
From Horowitz, I consider the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Risk-averse agents will always accept the risk-neutral reform path.
Hypothesis 1b: Risk-neutral agents will always accept the risk-neutral reform path.
Hypothesis 1c: Risk-loving agents will never accept the risk-neutral reform path.
These hypotheses come directly from Proposition 1 outlined in Horowitz.
Hypothesis 2a: Risk-averse agents will always accept the risk-averse reform path if it is within
their boundary plans.
Hypothesis 2b: Risk-neutral agents will never accept the risk-averse reform path.
Hypothesis 2c: Risk-loving agents will never accept the risk-averse reform path.
These hypotheses come directly from Proposition 2 outlined in Horowitz.

98
Hypothesis 3a: Once both agents accept the reform path, they should continue to do so until
the reform path terminates.
Hypothesis 3b: If at least one agent rejects the reform path and the status quo does not result
in the lottery, the losing agent should continue to play the lottery until they either win the
lottery or the reform path terminates.
These are implied from equations (4) and (5). Note that I do not provide a hypothesis for
the case of the status quo resulting, as there are possible interactions between the theory
and the experimental design which may cause the behavior of agents to change depending
on the specific circumstances in which the status quo occurs.
III.4 Experimental Design
Figure 1 gives a screenshot of the gameplay interface. I use an exchange rate of $0.20
USD to 1 ECU. The experiment is conducted within-subjects. Players are randomly and
anonymously matched each block in groups of two and may meet the same opponent in
consecutive blocks. Each player knows their partner’s type, allocations, 𝜋𝐴 , 𝜋𝐵 , and 𝜋𝑄 .
There are 40 blocks of 3 or 4 periods each. Subjects are guaranteed three periods; in the
third period (and each period after), there was a 75% probability that the current period
would be the final period. In practice, this resulted in all blocks terminating in the fourth
period, which is a strange draw – in expectation, 2.5 out of 40 blocks should go past 4
periods. This allows me to directly test hypothesis 3. Each period is 20 seconds long,
followed by a 10-second feedback period, meaning each block is, at maximum, 2 minutes
long. The reform path is randomized across groups within each block. Therefore, in a given
block, the social planner (the computer) makes an offer from one of the reform paths to
each group, but that offer may differ across groups. Each period, the subjects’ only task is to
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accept or reject the reform path. If both subjects accept the reform path, then their shares
of the asset in the next period will be equal to the new shares offered by the computer in
the current period. When the computer offers the risk-neutral reform path, all four periods
will be governed by equation (3). When the computer offers the risk-averse path, the total
value of the asset shrinks by 5 ECU. Reallocations of the smaller asset are governed by
equation 3, which depends on shares of each asset for adjustment rather than absolute size.
The game is played as follows. At the beginning of each period in a block, subjects
learn Probability A, Probability B, and Status Quo, along with their current allocations. The
probabilities are constant throughout a block. The computer then makes an offer for a
reform path based either the risk-neutral reform path or the risk-averse path. As outlined
above, only one type of path is presented within a block. All allocations come from either
the risk-neutral path or risk-averse path. Subjects then choose whether to accept or reject
the reform path. If both players accept the reform path, then their allocations adjust by the
relevant path moving into the next period.
If at least one player rejects the reform path, a lottery is played and the victorious
player enters the next period in possession of the entire asset, or the status quo is retained.
The reform path will not adjust to the new allocation; rather, it will continue to be
governed by both players’ initial allocations. If the subject does not make a choice within 20
seconds, his or her acceptance or rejection is determined randomly by the computer, with
each outcome having equal probability (and subjects are aware of how often this occurs).
Subjects are then shown the results and enter the next period in the block, with the new
allocations either based off the acceptance of the reform path or the results of the lottery. If
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the lottery is played in the final period, the result is binding; however, if the reform path is
accepted by both subjects, their final allocations will be equal to the last offer the computer

Figure 1: Screenshot
makes. In order to simulate an infinite horizon, subjects are not told when it is the final
period; the block simply ends. Subjects are paid using one randomly selected round.
Each participant was given a show-up fee of $5.00. Thus, with the best of luck (i.e.,
the subject winning the lottery in the payment round), the most a subject could earn was
$33, while, with the worst of luck, the worst a player could make was $5. Average earnings
were $16.36, maximum earnings were $29, and minimum earnings were $5. After all blocks
were completed, subjects answered a brief questionnaire containing a measure of risk
preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002), questions from the Global Preference Survey (Falk, et
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al., 2018; Falk, Dohmen, Huffman, & Sunde, 2016) about risk aversion, fairness, and
altruism, a risk-ranking task to elicit beliefs, questions from the International Personality
Item Pool “big 5” personality survey (Goldberg, 1999; Goldberg et al., 2006), and a Locus of
Control questionnaire (Rotter, 1966). The experiment was coded in z-Tree (Fishbacher,
2007). Data came from four sessions over three days with a total of 42 subjects at the
Business Behavioral Research Lab at the University of Arkansas.
III.4.1 Loss Aversion
In the redistributive game outlined in Horowitz, at least one player (the proposed
land donor) will face a certain loss if they choose to accept the reform path, and a possible
loss if they choose to reject it. Therefore, prospect theory and loss aversion (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) may offer some explanatory power over my results. It may be that
subjects are more loss-averse than they are risk-averse, leading them to reject the reform
path. To analyze this, consider Koszegi and Rabin (2006)’s utility function:
𝑢𝐴 (α𝑡 |𝑟𝑡 ) ≡ 𝑚𝐴 (α𝑡 ) + 𝑛𝐴 (α𝑡+1 |𝑟𝑡 )

(6)

𝑢𝐵 (ζ𝑡 |𝑠𝑡 ) ≡ 𝑚𝐵 (ζ𝑡 ) + 𝑛𝐵 (ζ𝑡+1 |𝑠𝑡 )

(7)

For player A and:

For player B, where 𝑢𝑖 is well-behaved and denotes the total utility function of player i, 𝑚𝑖
is player i’s utility from landholding, 𝑛𝑖 is player i’s gain-loss utility, and α𝑡 and ζ𝑡 are player
A and player B’s landholdings at time t, respectively. Further, let 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡 denote player A
and player B’s reference points at time t, respectively. Additionally, assume that α0 > 0 and
ζ0 > 0 and that α0 + ζ0 = 1. Combining equations (4) and (6) gives:
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𝑚𝐴 (𝜎(𝛼)) + 𝑛𝐴 (𝜎(𝛼)|𝑟) ≥ π𝐴 (𝑚𝐴 (1) + 𝑛𝐴 (1|𝑟))

(8)

+π𝐵 (𝑚𝐴 (0) + 𝑛𝐴 (0|𝑟)) + π𝑄 (𝑚𝐴 (α) + 𝑛𝐴 (α|𝑟))
For player A. Therefore, the decision now depends not only on the reform path, but on the
disutility from loss aversion. When the disutility from loss aversion is zero, the reform path
can proceed as normal. However, when 𝑛𝑖 is negative (loss aversion is experienced), the
utility from accepting the reform plan may be less than the utility from playing the lottery,
depending on the player’s reference point. The same result holds for player B. This gives:
Behavioral Hypothesis 1: If subjects are loss averse, they will accept the reform path lower
rates than are predicted by the theory.
III.5 Results
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Risk Aversion Type
VARIABLE

Percent of Subjects

N

𝐷𝑅𝐴

52.38%

22

𝐷𝑅𝑁

2.38%

18

𝐷𝑅𝐿

45.24%

2

Total
100%
42
Notes: This table includes only the results of the Holt and Laury test of risk preferences.
Table 1 gives the breakdown of risk preferences by subject. Risk preferences were
computed using the subject’s score on the Holt and Laury (2002) test and an alternative
risk measure, which is a question from the Global Preference Survey. Subjects were asked,
“In general, how willing are you to take risks? On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being
‘completely unwilling to do so’ and 10 being ‘very willing to do so.’ You can also use any of
the points in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.” Both measures were used
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because several subjects who marked themselves as “risk-loving” on the Holt and Laury
task marked themselves as “extremely unlikely to take risks” on the Global Preference
Survey list. In addition, only one subject listed themselves as “Risk-Neutral” on the Holt and
Laury test. Using this subject’s position on the Global Preference Survey as a benchmark, I
classify subjects who marked themselves as “risk-loving” on Holt and Laury, but less likely
to take risks than the risk-neutral subject as risk-neutral.
III.4.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 offers predictions regarding the behavior of the agents with regard to the
risk-neutral path, and states:
Hypothesis 1a: Risk-averse agents will always accept the risk-neutral reform path.
Hypothesis 1b: Risk-neutral agents will always accept the risk-neutral reform path.
Hypothesis 1c: Risk-loving agents will never accept the risk-neutral reform path.
To test hypothesis 1, I use a linear probability model of the form:
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = β1 𝐷𝑅𝐴 + β2 𝐷𝑅𝑁 + β3 𝐷𝑅𝐿 + ϵ

(9)

accept indicates whether the subject accepted the reform path in the first period of
each block. First-period acceptance is used because acceptance in future periods is likely to
be conditional on the success of the reform path in prior periods. 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable
indicating whether the subject is risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving, based on their
performance on the Holt and Laury test. Table 1 gives the counts and means of risk
preferences among subjects. Since only one subject identified as risk-neutral on the Holt
and Laury test, I will primarily focus on the results from the risk-averse and risk-loving
types, though I will report the results for the risk-neutral subject. To provide a direct test of
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the hypotheses, I test β1 = 1, β2 = 1, β3 = 0 and equalities of all betas. Table 2 gives the
marginal effects.
Table 2: Marginal Effects of Risk-Aversion Type on First-Period Acceptance, Risk Neutral
Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
LPM
Session FE
Gender
Time Effects
Gender and Time
0.630***
(0.0452)
0.590***
(0.0472)
0.261***
(0.0163)

𝐷𝑅𝐴
𝐷𝑅𝑁
𝐷𝑅𝐿
Male
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Time Effects

0.642***
(0.0728)
0.613***
(0.0848)
0.259***
(0.0408)
0.00462
(0.0834)
-0.0876
(0.103)
0.0342
(0.0749)

0.645***
(0.0748)
0.620***
(0.0814)
0.271***
(0.0731)
-0.0138
(0.0648)
0.00768
(0.0845)
-0.0878
(0.102)
0.0330
(0.0736)

0.671***
(0.0713)
0.641***
(0.0857)
0.290***
(0.0441)
0.00643
(0.0839)
-0.0837
(0.103)
0.0361
(0.0749)
-0.0570
(0.0402)

0.675***
(0.0733)
0.649***
(0.0822)
0.303***
(0.0749)
-0.0141
(0.0649)
0.00957
(0.0850)
-0.0838
(0.102)
0.0348
(0.0735)
-0.0571
(0.0402)

Observations
856
856
856
856
856
R-squared
0.605
0.608
0.608
0.610
0.610
Session FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively (Significantly
different from zero) Column (1) reports estimates of the model without session fixedeffects. Column (2) includes session fixed-effects. Column (3) includes gender effects.
Column (4) includes a variable for the second half of the session to account for time trends.
Column (5) includes session fixed effects, gender fixed effects, and time effects.
I fail to support Hypothesis 1. In all cases, the results of F-tests strongly indicate that
risk-neutral and risk-averse subjects do not accept the risk-neutral path in all cases (for the
tests β1 = 1 and β2 = 1 p=0.0000 in both cases), nor do risk-loving subjects reject the riskneutral path in all cases (p=0.0000). I cannot reject the null that β1 = β2 (p=0.54), but both
β1 and β2 are significantly different (and greater than) β3 (p=0.0000 in both cases). The
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addition of session fixed-effects (Column 2) slightly improves my results for risk-neutral
subjects, but not risk-averse or risk-loving subjects. The inclusion of session fixed-effects,
Table 3: Marginal Effects of Self-Reported Risk-Taking Behavior on First-Period
Acceptance, Risk-Neutral Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES

Risk

LPM

Session FE

Gender

Time Effects

Gender and
Time Effects

0.0814***

0.0497***

0.0483***

0.0446***

0.0434***

(0.0089)

(0.0133)

(0.0170)

(0.0120)

(0.0156)

Male
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3

0.0196

0.0180

(0.112)

(0.108)

0.281**

0.278**

0.261**

0.258**

(0.120)

(0.115)

(0.118)

(0.114)

0.255**

0.255**

0.230**

0.230**

(0.109)

(0.109)

(0.110)

(0.110)

0.383***

0.384***

0.360***

0.362***

(0.0868)

(0.0897)

(0.0889)

(0.0918)

0.0960*

0.0958*

(0.0494)

(0.0497)

Time Effects

Observations
R-squared
Session FE

856

856

856

856

856

0.453

0.501

0.501

0.505

0.505

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports estimates of the model without session fixed-effects. Column (2) includes session
fixed-effects. Column (3) includes gender effects. Column (4) includes a variable for the
second half of the session to account for time trends. Column (5) includes all variables.
gender effects, and second-half effects increases the magnitude marginal effects for riskaverse subjects, as well as risk-neutral subjects, though not enough to make the marginal
effects for β1 = 1 and β2 = 1. In addition, the results of the F-tests do not change.
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As a robustness check, I test an alternative risk measure, which is a question from
the Global Preference Survey. Subjects were asked, “In general, how willing are you to take
risks? On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being ‘completely unwilling to do so’ and 10 being
‘very willing to do so.’ You can also use any of the points in between to indicate where you
fall on the scale.” Unlike Holt and Laury, this question does not give me corresponding risk
aversion parameters for each point on the scale, so I use it in a linear probability model as a
continuous variable. I estimate the following linear probability model:
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = β1 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + ϵ

(10)

Table 3 gives the results of this specification. The effect is always less than 0.1,
though it is significant at the 99% level of confidence. In addition, the sign on the resulting
marginal effects is positive, which is the opposite of what would be expected. However, the
Pearson Correlation Coefficient is -0.1040, indicating a negative (correctly signed), but
small correlation between the two risk-preference measures, and this correlation is
significant (p<0.01).
III.4.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 2a: Risk-averse agents will always accept the risk-averse reform path if it is within
their boundary plans.
Hypothesis 2b: Risk-neutral agents will never accept the risk-averse reform path.
Hypothesis 2c: Risk-loving agents will never accept the risk-averse reform path.
Hypothesis 2 comes from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in Horowitz. To test this
hypothesis, I use a linear probability model of the form:
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𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = β1 𝐷𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + β2 𝐷𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + β3 𝐷𝑅𝑁 + β4 𝐷𝑅𝐿

(11)

+ϵ
accept indicates whether the subject accepted the reform path in the first period of each
block. First-period acceptance is used because acceptance in future periods is likely to be
conditional on the success of the reform path in prior periods. 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable
indicating whether the subject is risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving. The dummy for
subjects who are risk-averse is interacted with another dummy variable that denotes
whether the computer’s offer is within the agent’s boundary plan (Acceptable) or not
(Unacceptable). To provide a direct test of the hypotheses, I test β1 = 1, β2 = 0, β3 =
0, β4 = 0, and equalities of all betas. Table 4 gives the results of the linear probability model
and these tests.
Risk-averse types are less likely to choose to accept a risk-averse path that is inside
their boundary plan than the risk-neutral path. This is likely because the risk-neutral path
is the “knife-edge” (pareto-dominant) path in Horowitz. Thus, an important implication is
that the risk-neutral path is the one the planner ought to choose when dealing with riskaverse subjects. Though it appears that risk-averse subjects do accept paths that are
outside their boundary plan more than the paths inside their boundary plan, the coefficients
for these two variables are not significantly different from each other (p = 0.91).
Risk-neutral subjects behave mostly the same as they do as along the risk-neutral path,
accepting the offer between 59% and 65% of the time. As before, the marginal effects for
the risk-neutral subjects are not significantly different from the risk-averse subjects,
regardless of whether the path was an acceptable one (p=0.89) or an unacceptable one
(p=0.95).
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Table 4: Marginal Effects of Risk-Aversion Type on First-Period Acceptance, Risk Averse
Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
LPM
Session FE Gender
Time Effects Gender and Time
𝐷𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 0.579***

0.612***

0.605***

0.636***

0.630***

(0.0936)
0.590***

(0.0966)
0.636***

(0.0992)
0.622***

(0.0910)
0.661***

(0.0935)
0.648***

(0.0319)
0.593***
(0.0388)
0.353***
(0.0546)

(0.0508)
0.636***
(0.0504)
0.392***
(0.0922)

(0.0547)
0.615***
(0.0573)
0.356***
(0.108)
0.0419
(0.0511)
-0.0799
(0.0761)
-0.0800
(0.0661)
-0.0252
(0.0611)

(0.0507)
0.662***
(0.0542)
0.415***
(0.0898)

(0.0538)
0.641***
(0.0594)
0.379***
(0.105)
0.0422
(0.0511)
-0.0817
(0.0747)
-0.0832
(0.0659)
-0.0267
(0.0610)
-0.0471
(0.0415)

𝐷𝑅𝐴 ∗
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐷𝑅𝑁
𝐷𝑅𝐿
Male
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Time Effects

-0.0692
(0.0809)
-0.0791
(0.0664)
-0.0297
(0.0591)

-0.0709
(0.0795)
-0.0823
(0.0663)
-0.0312
(0.0591)
-0.0469
(0.0414)

Observations
824
824
824
824
824
R-squared
0.584
0.586
0.586
0.587
0.587
Session FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports estimates of the model without session fixed-effects. Column (2) includes session
fixed-effects. Column (3) includes gender effects. Column (4) includes a variable for the
second half of the session to account for time trends. Column (5) includes session fixed
effects, gender fixed effects, and time effects.
The coefficient for risk-loving subjects is significantly different from both riskaverse cases (p=0.043 for the acceptable offers and p=0.0005 for the unacceptable offers),
as well as the risk-neutral case (p=0.0009). In addition, I can reject the hypotheses that
β1 = 1 (p=0.0001), β2 = 0 (p=0.0000), β3 = 0 (p=0.0000), and β4 = 0 (p=0.0000). These
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results are robust to the addition of session fixed effects, gender fixed effects, and time
effects.
Table 5: Marginal Effects of Self-Reported Risk-Taking Behavior on First-Period
Acceptance, Risk-Averse Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
LPM
Session FE
Gender
Time
Gender and
Effects
Time Effects
Risk

0.0846***
(0.00771)

0.0578***
(0.0121)

Male
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3

0.197*
(0.113)
0.250**
(0.0987)
0.298***
(0.0946)

Time Effects

0.0528*** 0.0505***
(0.0156) (0.0101)
0.0757
(0.0930)
0.177*
0.175
(0.0991)
(0.112)
0.244**
0.227**
(0.0943) (0.0957)
0.303*** 0.272***
(0.0977) (0.0919)
0.127**
(0.0491)

0.0458***
(0.0135)
0.0733
(0.0874)
0.156
(0.0988)
0.222**
(0.0921)
0.277***
(0.0952)
0.126**
(0.0492)

Observations
824
824
824
824
824
R-squared
0.442
0.478
0.480
0.486
0.487
Session FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports estimates of the model without session fixed-effects. Column (2) includes session
fixed-effects. Column (3) includes gender effects. Column (4) includes a variable for the
second half of the session to account for time trends. Column (5) includes all variables.
As with Hypothesis 1, I use the alternative risk measure as a robustness check for
these results:
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = β1 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + ϵ

(12)

Table 5 gives the results of this specification. The results are very similar to the marginal
effects along the risk neutral path, with the marginal effects being less than 0.1 and
significantly different from zero in all cases. The addition of fixed effects (as above) also
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diminishes the magnitude of the marginal effects from this measure, though not their
significance. As with Hypothesis 1, I fail to support Hypothesis 2.
III.4.3 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 states:
Hypothesis 3a: Once both agents accept the reform path, they should continue to do so until
the reform path terminates.
Hypothesis 3b: If at least one agent rejects the reform path and the status quo does not result
in the lottery, the losing agent should continue to play the lottery until they either win the
lottery or the reform path terminates.
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
Accept, All 3 Periods Reject, All 3 Periods Accept, First Period
Only

Accept, First and
Second Period

Other Behavior

Figure 2: Acceptance Behavior Along the Reform Path
Notes: “Other behavior” includes behavior such as “testing” the reform path by only
accepting it in the second period, or behavior which could be attributed to off-path
behavior, such as mistakes where subjects accidentally rejecting the path in the second
period when they intended to accept).
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These both come from Propositions 1 and 2 in Horowitz. Figure 2 gives the averages for
subject acceptance behavior.
Subjects accept the reform path in all periods in approximately 36.5% of the sample,
and subjects reject the reform path in all periods in approximately 21.8% of cases. The next
most common behaviors involve subjects accepting in the first period only or first and
second periods, then rejecting in the third. These may be because the subjects’ partner may
reject the path in the prior period, leading the subject to reject in subsequent periods, and
are not necessarily counter to the hypothesis. Figure 3 gives the conditional acceptance and
rejection rates. After subjects’ partners accept the reform path in the first and second
periods, subjects accept the reform path over 30% of the time in subsequent periods. These
rates drop after rejection. The second component of Hypothesis 3 states, “If at least one
agent rejects the reform path and the status quo does not result in the lottery, the losing
agent should continue to play the lottery until they either win the lottery or the reform
path terminates.” Figure 4 gives the rates of acceptance or rejection of the reform path after
a win or loss. Surprisingly, it appears that subjects behave almost exactly opposite to this
hypothesis: losers accept the reform path in the next period more frequently than they
reject it.
In addition, though not specifically covered by this hypothesis, winners behave
almost exactly opposite to losers – they play the lottery more after they win than when they
lose. Therefore, I also fail to support either component of hypothesis 3.
III.4.4 Behavioral Hypothesis 1
Behavioral Hypothesis 1 is:
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Behavioral Hypothesis 1: If subjects are loss averse, they will accept the reform path lower
rates than is predicted by the theory.

0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
Accept Second Period,
Partner Accepted First
Period

Accept Third Period,
Partner Accepted Second
Period

Accept Second Period,
Partner Rejected First
Period

Accept Third Period,
Partner Rejected Second
Period

Figure 3: Conditional Acceptance Behavior Along the Reform Path
Notes: “Conditional Acceptance” denotes acceptance of the reform path conditional on the
subject’s partner’s behavior in the previous round.
Subjects, especially donors, who are loss averse may reject the reform path at higher rates
because they take their current allocation as a reference point (this is also given as the
reference point in Horowitz), and view any proposed decrease as a guaranteed loss if both
accept, but view the lottery as a possible gain if they reject.
Combining the probability of the status quo with the probability of victory of the
agent who stands to lose gives an increased likelihood of a “no-loss” scenario, which makes
subjects more likely to reject the reform path. An argument may also be made that
recipients may view even a small gain as a loss if they take the value of the whole asset as
their reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006).
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Accept, Period 3 after losing Period 2
Accept, Period 2 after losing Period 1
Accept, Period 3 after winning Period 2
Accept, Period 2 after winning Period 1
Reject, Period 3 after winning Period 2
Reject, Period 2 after winning Period 1
Reject, Period 3 after losing Period 2
Reject, Period 2 after losing Period 1
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

Figure 4: Conditional Acceptance Behavior after Winning or Losing the Lottery
Notes: “Conditional Acceptance” denotes acceptance of the reform path conditional on the
subject’s outcome in the lottery in the previous round.
To test whether subjects are loss averse, I estimate the average loss aversion of the
subjects using the linear probability model:
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = β0 𝐷𝑅𝐿 + β1 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + β2 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 + β3 𝐷𝑅𝐴

(13)

+ β4 𝐷𝑅𝑁 + ϵ
As before, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating a subject’s risk preferences. Here, I have
treated the dummy variable for risk loving subjects as the constant for the linear
probability model (running the model with a constant and with the risk loving variable as a
constant yields the same value for both). EquivalentLoss is an interaction between the
absolute value of a transfer and a dummy variable indicating that the transfer is a loss to
the subject. EquivalentGain is an interaction between the absolute value of a transfer and a
dummy variable indicating that the transfer is a gain to the subject. Accept is a dummy
variable that denotes first-period acceptance. If β1 > β2 , then subjects are (on average) loss
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averse. Table 6 gives the results of this linear probability model for the risk-neutral path.
Column (1) contains estimates of the model outlined above. The dummy for risk-loving did
not take the place of a constant, so a constant was estimated. The coefficients on the
Equivalent Loss and Equivalent Gain are not statistically different from each other (p=0.91),
and the coefficient for Equivalent Loss is incorrectly signed (positive). Both marginal effects
are significantly different from zero.
It may be that there are session-specific effects, so fixed effects for each session are
included in column 2, though, again, this does not change the sign on the marginal effects
for the loss variable, nor are the effects of losses significantly different from gains (p=0.88).
The addition of gender and time effects also do not change the sign of the loss variable.
Table 7 gives the results for the risk-averse path. The results are similar to those along the
risk-neutral path - the effects of a loss are still positive and insignificantly different from
gains (p=0.56), and this does not change with the inclusion of session fixed effects, gender
effects, and time effects.
However, it could also be that subjects with different risk preferences react to gains
and losses differently. To control for this, I run a second linear probability model, similar to
the one above, with interactions between the Equivalent Loss and Equivalent Gain variables
and the dummy variables that indicate a subject’s risk preference type. I expect that the
sign for the loss interactions will be negative, and the sign for the gain interactions will be
positive. For Risk-Averse subjects, these are further split between acceptable and
unacceptable offers (as in Hypothesis 2 above). Table 8 gives the marginal effects for the
risk-neutral path. Along the risk neutral path, the signs for the loss interactions for both
risk-averse and risk-neutral subjects are negative, but not significantly different from zero.
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In addition, though the difference between the interactions for gains and losses for riskaverse subjects are significantly different (p=0.006), this is not the case for any of the other
interactions (p=0.23 for risk-neutral and p=0.56 for risk-loving). The addition of fixedeffects for session, time, and gender does not change the sign of the interactions, but it also
does not make them significantly different from zero.
Table 9 gives the marginal effects for the risk-averse path. In contrast to the risk-neutral
results in Table 8, loss interactions (both acceptable and unacceptable) for risk-averse
subjects are now incorrectly signed, but are not significantly different from zero. The
marginal effects for the risk-neutral loss interactions are correctly signed, but insignificant.
However, subjects who are risk-averse do react differently to gains and losses in both cases
(p=0.048 for the acceptable offers and p=0.004 for the unacceptable offers). The addition of
fixed effects for session, gender, and time effects cause the interaction between an
acceptable offer and the loss variable to become significantly different from zero, but the
sign is still positive. Risk-averse subjects still treat losses and gains differently, regardless
of whether the path is acceptable or not, with the marginal effects of gains being
significantly greater than the marginal effects of losses for these subjects.
I am unable to support behavioral hypothesis 1. Though the signs for loss and gain
interaction terms are correct for the risk-neutral path, the marginal effects are not
significantly different from zero. In the case of the risk-averse path, the addition of fixedeffects does make the marginal effects for the interaction between risk-averse acceptable
offers and losses significantly different from zero, but the sign is incorrect (positive).
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VARIABLES
Equivalent
Loss
Equivalent
Gain
Share of
Asset
Risk Averse
Risk Neutral
Risk Loving

Table 6: Estimates of Loss Aversion, Risk-Neutral Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
LPM
Session FE
Gender
Time Effects Gender and Time
Effects
0.556***

0.563***

0.562***

0.559***

0.558***

(0.181)
0.532***

(0.180)
0.530***

(0.179)
0.530***

(0.179)
0.535***

(0.179)
0.534***

(0.175)
0.168

(0.175)
0.169

(0.174)
0.168

(0.176)
0.169

(0.175)
0.168

(0.113)
0.274***
(0.0411)
0.334***
(0.0394)
-0.0780
(0.0512)

(0.112)
0.325***
(0.0939)
0.356***
(0.0498)
-0.0288
(0.0951)
0.227**
(0.0914)
0.130
(0.168)
0.254*
(0.144)
0.169
(0.156)

(0.107)
0.331**
(0.131)
0.358***
(0.0639)
-0.0268
(0.107)
0.219
(0.154)
0.123
(0.207)
0.248
(0.187)
0.162
(0.199)
0.00571
(0.0704)

(0.111)
0.326***
(0.0948)
0.356***
(0.0500)
-0.0284
(0.0957)
0.258**
(0.0967)
0.163
(0.172)
0.285*
(0.149)
0.198
(0.160)

(0.107)
0.331**
(0.132)
0.358***
(0.0641)
-0.0263
(0.107)
0.251
(0.157)
0.157
(0.211)
0.279
(0.192)
0.192
(0.202)
0.00564
(0.0703)
-0.0605
(0.0402)
0
(0)

Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4
Male
Time Effects
Constant

0.249***
(0.0791)

0
(0)

0
(0)

-0.0605
(0.0402)
0
(0)

Observations
856
856
856
856
856
R-squared
0.088
0.097
0.097
0.101
0.101
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports estimates of the model without session fixed-effects. Column (2) includes session
fixed-effects. Column (3) includes gender effects. Column (4) includes a variable for the
second half of the session to account for time trends. Column (5) includes all variables.
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VARIABLES
Equivalent Loss
Equivalent Gain
Share of Asset
Risk Averse,
Acceptable
Risk Averse,
Unacceptable
Risk Neutral
Risk Loving
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4

Table 7: Estimates of Loss Aversion, Risk-Averse Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
LPM
Session
Gender
Time
Gender and Time
FE
Effects
Effects
0.492**
(0.184)
0.624***
(0.203)
0.156
(0.153)
0.0892

0.485***
(0.179)
0.632***
(0.204)
0.156
(0.151)
0.0887

0.490***
(0.180)
0.644***
(0.205)
0.162
(0.151)
0.147

0.486***
(0.176)
0.630***
(0.204)
0.156
(0.150)
0.0880

0.492***
(0.177)
0.642***
(0.204)
0.162
(0.150)
0.147

(0.0666)
0.232***

(0.106)
0.229**

(0.116)
0.285**

(0.104)
0.229**

(0.115)
0.285**

(0.0785) (0.108)
0.358*** 0.356***
(0.0709) (0.0678)
-0.115*** -0.112
(0.0399) (0.0830)
0.280***
(0.0884)
0.251*
(0.134)
0.300**
(0.132)
0.286**
(0.138)

(0.117)
0.381***
(0.0704)
-0.0911
(0.0831)
0.183
(0.128)
0.168
(0.159)
0.226
(0.154)
0.201
(0.162)
0.0696
(0.0505)

(0.107)
0.357***
(0.0672)
-0.112
(0.0821)
0.303***
(0.0883)
0.273**
(0.130)
0.323**
(0.127)
0.310**
(0.133)

(0.116)
0.381***
(0.0697)
-0.0909
(0.0823)
0.206
(0.126)
0.190
(0.154)
0.249
(0.149)
0.226
(0.157)
0.0697
(0.0505)
-0.0447
(0.0413)
0
(0)

Male
Time Effects
Constant

0.279***
(0.0881)

0
(0)

0
(0)

-0.0446
(0.0412)
0
(0)

Observations
824
824
824
824
824
R-squared
0.086
0.088
0.092
0.090
0.094
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports estimates of the model without session fixed-effects. Column (2) includes session
fixed-effects. Column (3) includes gender effects. Column (4) includes a variable for the
second half of the session to account for time trends. Column (5) includes all variables.
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Table 8: The Interaction Effects Between Risk Preference Type and Loss-Averseion
Estimates, Risk-Neutral Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Risk Preference Session
Gender
Time Effects
Gender and
Type
FE
Time Effects
Share of Asset
Equivalent
Loss
Equivalent
Gain
Risk Averse
Risk Neutral
Risk Loving
Risk
Averse*Gain
Risk
Averse*Loss
Risk
Neutral*Gain
Risk
Neutral*Loss
Risk
Loving*Gain
Risk
Loving*Loss
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3

0.162
(0.115)
0.658*

0.164
(0.114)
0.683*

0.162
(0.109)
0.682*

0.163
(0.113)
0.743*

0.162
(0.109)
0.742*

(0.349)
-0.149

(0.366)
-0.125

(0.366)
-0.127

(0.370)
-0.168

(0.370)
-0.170

(0.453)
0.159**
(0.0596)
0.280***
(0.0482)
-0.0609
(0.0552)
0.891**

(0.442)
0.202*
(0.114)
0.299***
(0.0662)
-0.0218
(0.0998)
0.878**

(0.440)
0.208
(0.150)
0.301***
(0.0793)
-0.0198
(0.111)
0.880**

(0.433)
0.190
(0.115)
0.296***
(0.0666)
-0.0285
(0.101)
0.931**

(0.431)
0.196
(0.151)
0.298***
(0.0797)
-0.0265
(0.112)
0.932**

(0.422)
-0.233

(0.416)
-0.226

(0.414)
-0.226

(0.407)
-0.296

(0.405)
-0.296

(0.292)
0.362

(0.310)
0.339

(0.310)
0.339

(0.312)
0.346

(0.313)
0.346

(0.409)
-0.127

(0.397)
-0.151

(0.398)
-0.151

(0.382)
-0.169

(0.383)
-0.169

(0.348)
0.0389

(0.365)
0.0204

(0.365)
0.0213

(0.369)
0.0543

(0.369)
0.0553

(0.185)
0.202

(0.188)
0.176

(0.189)
0.176

(0.197)
0.136

(0.197)
0.136

(0.243)

(0.240)
0.312***
(0.111)
0.221
(0.187)
0.350**

(0.240)
0.305*
(0.170)
0.214
(0.224)
0.344

(0.237)
0.356***
(0.118)
0.267
(0.192)
0.395**

(0.238)
0.349*
(0.175)
0.261
(0.229)
0.389*
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Table 8 (Cont.)
VARIABLES

(1)
Risk Preference
Type

Session 4

(2)
Session
FE

(3)
Gender

(4)
Time Effects

(5)
Gender and
Time Effects

0.265
(0.170)

0.258
(0.213)

0.307*
(0.175)

0.301
(0.217)

-0.0634
(0.0394)
0
(0)

0.00571
(0.0702)
-0.0633
(0.0394)
0
(0)

Male

0.00579
(0.0702)

Time Effects
Constant

0.331***
(0.0945)

0
(0)

0
(0)

Observations
856
856
856
856
856
R-squared
0.095
0.104
0.104
0.108
0.108
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports all risk and loss variables. Column (2) reports Session Fixed-Effects Column (3)
reports gender effects, Column (4) reports time effects, and Column (5) reports gender and
time effects.
Table 9: The Interaction Effects Between Risk Preference Type and Loss-Aversion
Estimates, Risk-Averse Path
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Risk Preference Session
Gender
Time
Gender and
Type
FE
Effects
Time Effects
Share of Asset

0.145
(0.161)

0.145
(0.159)

0.151
(0.158)

0.145
(0.158)

0.150
(0.157)

Equivalent
Loss

0.426
(0.402)

0.412
(0.398)

0.409
(0.390)

0.372
(0.402)

0.369
(0.369)

Equivalent
Gain

-1.580**
(0.733)

-1.575**
(0.749)

-1.595**
(0.747)

-1.464*
(0.735)

-1.484*
(0.737)

Risk
Averse*Gain,
Acceptable
Path

2.003**
(0.790)

2.013**
(0.800)

2.022**
(0.803)

1.898**
(0.779)

1.906**
(0.782)
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Table 9 (Cont.)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Risk Preference
Type
0.469
(0.283)

Session
FE
0.471*
(0.278)

Gender
0.466*
(0.276)

Time
Effects
0.506*
(0.284)

Gender and
Time Effects
0.501*
(0.283)

Risk
Averse*Gain,
Unacceptable
Path

2.274***
(0.748)

2.278***
(0.756)

2.301***
(0.761)

2.169***
(0.740)

2.191***
(0.746)

Risk
Averse*Loss,
Unacceptable
Path

0.0498
(0.392)

0.0637
(0.396)

0.0741
(0.389)

0.111
(0.411)

0.122
(0.405)

Risk Neutral
Gain

0.590
(0.719)

0.585
(0.730)

0.608
(0.733)

0.551
(0.728)

0.574
(0.731)

Risk Neutral
Loss

-0.556
(0.345)

-0.542
(0.355)

-0.530
(0.354)

-0.540
(0.364)

-0.527
(0.362)

Risk Loving
Gain

1.609***
(0.195)

1.610***
(0.194)

1.630***
(0.200)

1.529***
(0.179)

1.548***
(0.184)

Risk Loving
Loss

0.537**
(0.256)

0.529**
(0.254)

0.525**
(0.251)

0.568**
(0.246)

0.564**
(0.243)

Risk Averse,
Acceptable
Path

0.00180
(0.115)

-0.00540
(0.149)

0.0508
(0.154)

0.00598
(0.147)

0.0623
(0.152)

Risk Averse,
Unacceptable
Path

0.0673
(0.111)

0.0592
(0.137)

0.113
(0.141)

0.0724
(0.137)

0.126
(0.142)

Risk Neutral

0.251**
(0.0943)

0.249**
(0.0939)

0.272***
(0.0958)

0.252***
(0.0926)

0.275***
(0.0945)

VARIABLES
Risk
Averse*Loss,
Unacceptable
Path
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Table 9 (Cont.)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

Risk Preference
Type

Session
FE

Gender

Time
Effects

Gender and
Time Effects

Risk Loving

-0.176***
(0.0610)

-0.179*
(0.0910)
0.443***
(0.110)
0.421***
(0.155)
0.471***
(0.148)
0.453***
(0.154)

-0.161*
(0.0884)
0.350**
(0.138)
0.343*
(0.173)
0.401**
(0.165)
0.372**
(0.172)
0.0684
(0.0509)

-0.169*
(0.0918)
0.451***
(0.110)
0.429***
(0.154)
0.480***
(0.147)
0.463***
(0.152)

-0.151*
(0.0894)
0.359**
(0.138)
0.350**
(0.171)
0.410**
(0.164)
0.382**
(0.170)
0.0685
(0.0509)
-0.0414
(0.0403)
0
(0)

Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4
Male
Time Effects
Constant

0.441***
(0.108)

0
(0)

0
(0)

-0.0413
(0.0402)
0
(0)

Observations
824
824
824
824
824
R-squared
0.093
0.094
0.098
0.096
0.100
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses below the
marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. Column (1)
reports all risk and loss variables. Column (2) reports Session Fixed-Effects, Column (3)
reports gender effects, Column (4) reports time effects, and Column (5) reports gender and
time effects.
However, in this case, I can make a weaker statement, which is that risk-averse
subjects with an acceptable offer are more likely to accept the reform path when the offer is
a gain rather than a loss. Table 9 gives the marginal effects for the risk-averse path. In
contrast to the risk-neutral results in Table 8, loss interactions (both acceptable and
unacceptable) for risk-averse subjects are now incorrectly signed, but are not significantly
different from zero. The marginal effects for the risk-neutral loss interactions are correctly
signed, but insignificant. However, subjects who are risk-averse do react differently to
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gains and losses in both cases (p=0.048 for the acceptable offers and p=0.004 for the
unacceptable offers). The addition of fixed effects for session, gender, and time effects
cause the interaction between an acceptable offer and the loss variable to become
significantly different from zero, but the sign is still positive. Risk-averse subjects still treat
losses and gains differently, regardless of whether the path is acceptable or not, with the
marginal effects of gains being significantly greater than the marginal effects of losses for
these subjects.
III.6 Conclusion
This paper provides an experimental test of the theory outlined in Horowitz (1993),
which provides a set of safe reform paths (conditional on risk preferences) designed to
reallocate shares of a fixed asset between two players. I use a within-subjects design in
which two subjects are randomly matched each block over the course of 40 blocks, with
each block containing either 3 or 4 periods. I find that, contrary to the predictions of the
theory, subjects do not always accept the safe reform path when they should do so. This
allows me to examine the causes of conflict between the parties. However, I am unable to
show that loss aversion is the primary cause of conflict. There are a few possible
explanations, one being that the sample size of each risk preference type may simply be too
small to make any causal statements. In addition, there is significant noise surrounding the
measurement of risk preferences, which may be confounding the results. It could also be
that subjects are employing different levels of thinking (as indicated by subjects seemingly
deciding to accept or reject almost in accordance with a coin flip), and this was not
measured in my experimental design.
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Further research in this area could be a replication of this experiment that accounts
explicitly for levels of thinking using the “Eyes in the Mind” test to see if subjects are
thinking critically about their acceptance or rejection decision, or merely choosing an
option at random. A more explicit measure of loss aversion could also be used.
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Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation is to examine distributional behavior and reactions to
re-distributional regimes. The first chapter examines whether agents use information
acquisition as an avoidance mechanism when making distributional decisions, and finds
that agents use information acquisition as a means of creating a “veil of ignorance” about
the outcomes of their actions. The second chapter builds upon the first chapter by adding a
compounding factory of social identity, along with a new game framework. Theory predicts
that agents with strong attachment to their own group will contribute more to the public
good when they believe it will disproportionately benefit their in-group members at the
expense of their out-group members. Agents will also acquire more information when they
believe that the public good will disproportionately benefit their ingroup members. The
third chapter examines how agents react to a theoretical reform path that seeks to
redistribute shares of an asset (land) more equitably between them. Agents do not always
accept the reform path, though the reform path does not completely fail at keeping the
peace, either.
Generally speaking, the central finding of this dissertation is that agents will use
whatever means they have at their disposal to engage in their desired distributional
behavior. When confronted with noisy environments, agents will use information to create
a “veil of ignorance” to shield themselves from the consequences of their decisions. Agents
who have strong group preferences are expected to bias their beliefs in noisy environments
to benefit in-group members, potentially at the expense of outgroup members. Finally,
agents do not generally acquiesce to redistributive behavior. These findings provide a
strong basis for future research. For example, a future paper series based on this
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dissertation will explore the impact of privilege on distributional behavior. Others will
focus on group formation mechanisms and coordination failure in redistributive
environments.

